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INTELLECTUAL CONTRACT AND INTELLECTUAL LAW
DanielF. Spulber*
Abstract
Technological change is altering the nature of contract toward a
greater focus on intangible assets. The direction of technological change
toward greater connectivity, interoperability, mobile communications,
the Internet of Things (loT), artificial intelligence (AI), virtual inventions,
and cooperative research and development (R&D) has profound
implications. This Article develops a new framework that I refer to as
"Intellectual Law" to address this shift. It will introduce the new concept
of "Intellectual Contract" (IC) to characterize an agreement for invention,
innovation, and technology adoption. This Article also introduces the
concept of "Intellectual Tort" (IT) to describe liability including but not
limited to misappropriation of trade secrets and infringement of patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. Intellectual Law provides a consistent
framework for IC, IT and Intellectual Property (IP). The article observes
that legal protections for inventors cannot rely solely on what has proven
to be a flawed combination of IT and IP. This Article argues that greater
emphasis on IC rules would improve both IT and IP. Because an IC
protects expectation interests, it is essential for creating, developing,
sharing, and applying intangible assets. An IC generates gains from trade
that enhance the benefits of inventors, innovators and adopters beyond
what can be achieved by IT and IP alone. The discussion sets forth some
broad principles for IC law, examines the differences between an IC and
a standard contract, and identifies the main forms of ICs.
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INTRODUCTION

Conceptual legal frameworks must catch up with fundamental
technological change. Major technological developments include
dramatic increases in digital connectivity and interoperability as well as
significant advances in Information and Communications Technology
(ICT). 1 These technological shifts drive what has been called the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (41R). 2 Important innovations that involve digital
connectivity and interoperability include the Internet of Things (JoT),
artificial intelligence (Al), cloud computing, data analytics, mobile
communications, autonomous vehicles, additive manufacturing, and
virtual reality. 3
1. YANN

MtNItRE ET AL., EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, PATENTS

AND THE FOURTH

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE INVENTIONS BEHIND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

17 (European

Patent Office ed., 2017) ("[T]he combined use of a wide range of new technologies in a large
variety of sectors of the economy. These include digitisation and highly effective connectivity,
but also technologies such as cloud computing and artificial intelligence that have permitted the

development of interconnected smart objects operating autonomously.").
2. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth IndustrialRevolution: What It Means and How to Respond,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-12/fourthindustrial-revolution ("The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam power to mechanize
production. The Second used electric power to create mass production. The Third used electronics
and information technology to automate production. Now a Fourth Industrial Revolution is
building on the Third, the digital revolution that has been occurring since the middle of the last
century. It is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the
physical, digital, and biological spheres."); see also KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION (2017).
3. See MtNILRE, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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Achieving digital connectivity involves the formation of networks
with many companies providing network components and connecting
devices to the network, including mobile communications and
autonomous vehicles. Companies require contracts to coordinate digital
connectivity. As Spulber and Yoo observe, "networks come from supply
decisions by network providers, interconnection between networks,
demand decisions by network customers, and supply decisions by
providers of complementary services." 4 The many types of access to
networks, including retail, wholesale, interconnection, platform, and
unbundled access, generally require contracts between firms. 5
Firms also share knowledge through the formation of innovation
networks. 6 The modular organization of production means that many
firms are involved in the production of components and assembly of the
final product. 7 Innovative products that contain new types of components
and introduce inventions require knowledge of the technology of each
component and knowledge about how to combine these technologies. 8
Complex innovations in particular require the combination of many new
technologies. 9 Firms must make contractual agreements to obtain the
components and to make sure they interoperate effectively. Firms
creating complex innovations thus require contracts to coordinate
inventive and innovative activities.
This Article introduces the concepts of "Intellectual Contract" (IC)
and "Intellectual Tort" (IT) to advance and broaden the legal analysis of
technological change and intangible assets. IC, IT, and Intellectual
Property (IP) are becoming increasingly important given the rate and
direction of technological change and greater focus on intangible assets.
The principles of common law still apply to intangible assets. 10 However,
4. DANIEL F. SPULBER AND CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS:

ECONOMICS AND LAW 39 (2009).
5. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Network Regulation: The Many Faces of
Access, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 635 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Charles Dhanasai & Arvind Parkhe, Orchestrating Innovation Networks
31 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 659, 659 (2006); see generally Eric Von Hippel, Horizontal Innovation
Networks By and for Users, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 293 (2007).
7. Kim B. Clark, The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in
Technological Evolution, 14 RES. POL'Y 235,235 (1985); Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark,
Architecture Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure
of Established Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 9, 11 (1990); Karl Ulrich, The Role of Product
Architecture in the Manufacturing Firm, 24 RES. POL'Y 419,419 (1995).
8. Henderson & Clark, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents: Bargaining and Incentives to
Invent (Feb. 20, 2019) available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338997.
10. See Richard Epstein, Intellectual Property and the Law of Contract: The Case Against
"Efficient Breach," 9 EUR. REV. OF CONT. L. 345 (2013); see also RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
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IC, IT, and IP lack a framework that addresses the important additional
implications of technological change and intangible assets.
Accordingly, this Article introduces a framework, referred to as
"Intellectual Law," to reflect major developments in legal practice and
economic activity. Intellectual Law is central to myriad legal cases,
including over 5,000 patent case filings per year in the U.S." Copyright
infringement cases in Federal District Court numbered 5,042 in 2015 and
3,944 in 2016.12 Trademark infringement cases totaled 38,486 between
2009 and 2017, with 8,502 of those cases overlapping with commercial
claims. 13 Litigation in federal courts involving trade secrets has also
increased. 14 All areas of IP are expanding rapidly; the US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) has granted over 10 million patents and
handled over 9 million trademark applications or registrations.1 5 One
estimate puts the value of IP in the US at over $5 trillion. 16
This Article argues there is a need for a general Intellectual Law
framework that approaches IC, IT, and IP consistently and sheds light on
their interactions. The proposed new framework of Intellectual Law will
contribute to Science and Technology Law. 17 The purpose of the
11.Chris Barry et al., 2017 Patent Litigation Study: Change on the Horizon?, PWC
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2017-patent-litigationstudy.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2017). There is also significant trademark litigation. William
Bryner, U.S. Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N (Sept.
2017), https://www.inta.org/trademarkadministration/Documents/2017/Bryner%20-%20U.S.%
20Trademark%20and%20Unfair%20Competition%20Litigation%2009142017/Bryner%20-%
20U.S.%20Trademark%20and%20Unfair%20Competition%20Litigation%2009142017.pdf.
12. Copyright Infringement LitigationFell22 Percent in FY2016, TRACREPORTS (Nov. 21,
2016), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/445/.
13. Steve Brachman, Lex Machina's 2017 Trademark Litigation Report Shows High
Percentage of Overall Damages Awarded on Default Judgment, IPWATcHDOG (Dec. 5, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/12/05/2017-trademark-litigation-report-damages-awardeddefault-judgment/id=90683/.
14. David Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 293 (2009).
15. See Patents Through History, USPTO, https://10millionpatents.uspto.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2018); Trademark Case Files Dataset, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/electronic-data-products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2018);
see also Stuart Graham et al., The USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset:Descriptions, Lessons,
and Insights, 22 J. OF EcON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 669, 669-705 (2013).
16. Robert Shapiro & Kevin Hassett, The Economic Value of Intellectual Property,
SONECON 2, http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/IntellectualPropertyReport-October2005.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
17. See generally CARA MORRIS & JOSEPH CARVALKO, THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
GUIDEBOOK FOR LAWYERs (2014); ABA Groups: Section of Science and Technology Law, AM. B.
Ass'N,https://www.americanbar.org/groups/science-technology/about-us.html (last visited Sept.
19, 2018) ("The mission of the ABA Section of Science & Technology Law is to provide
leadership on emerging issues at the intersection of law, science, and technology; to promote
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framework is to approach scientific issues and technological change in a
more integrated fashion. Practitioners and scholars should avoid the costs
and effort of reinventing the wheel when encountering each new
technological development.
IP differs from traditional property because of differences between
intangible and tangible assets. These differences affect the completeness,
excludability, and transferability of intangible assets. ICs differ
fundamentally from traditional contracts because ICs must handle
problems that arise in inducing cooperative investment in intangible
assets. ITs differ from traditional torts because of the additional
difficulties in determining validity and infringement of IP and finding
remedies for infringement.1 8
Intellectual Law has become essential because technological change
has increased the economic importance of intangible assets relative to that
of tangible assets. Investment in knowledge is a major driver of economic
growth. 19 The U.S. national income accounts began to recognize R&D
investment as part of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as of 2013.20 Private
industry invests about two-thirds of annual R&D expenditures in the
U.S., which amounted to over $527 billion in 2017.21 U.S. investment in
intangible assets exceeds $1 trillion per year, with a capitalized value of
over $6 trillion. 22 Intangible assets constitute about 85% of the total
market value of the S&P 500 companies. 23
This Article devises the concept of Intellectual Contract to
characterize an agreement to create, develop, share, or apply intangible
assets involved in technological change. An IC has the standard contract
features of offer, acceptance, and consideration, but differs from contracts
that involve tangible assets. ICs include agreements related to traditional
sound policy and public understanding on such issues; and to enhance the professional

development of its members.").
18. For further discussion of problems related to infringement damages, see Daniel F.
Spulber, Finding Reasonable Royalty Damages: A Contract Approach to Patent Infringement,
2019 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
19. Charles Hulten, Stimulating Economic Growth Through Knowledge-Based Investment
(OECD Sci., Tech. & Industry, Working Paper No. 2, 2013), http://www.observatorioabaco.es/
biblioteca/docs/412_OECDWP_02_2013.pdf.
20. FRANCISCO MORIS ET AL., NAT'L Sci. FOUND., R&D RECOGNIZED AS INVESTMENT IN
U.S.

GDP STATISTICS:

GDP INCREASE

SLIGHTLY

LOWERS R&D-To-GDP

RATIO

(2015),

https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2015/nsfl5315/.
21. U.S. R&D: Slow Growth and Opportunities, 2017 GLOBAL R&D FUNDING FORECAST,
Winter 2017, at 7.
22. Leonard I. Nakamura, What Is the U.S. GrossInvestment in Intangibles? (At Least) One
Trillion Dollars a Year! 5 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001).
23. Cate M. Elsten & Nick Hill, Intangible Asset Market Value Study?, 52 J. OF THE
LICENSING EXEC. SoC'Y INT'L 245, 245-47 (2017); BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT,

MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING (2001); Baruch Lev, Remarks on the Measurement, Valuation,
and Reporting of Intangible Assets 17 (N.Y.U. Working Paper No. 2451-27468, 2003).
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types of IP, that is, trade secrets, patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
However, ICs also include non-traditional intangible assets such as
knowledge, discoveries, inventions, innovations, and adoption of
innovations that are not covered by standard IP. ICs not only include the
upper tail of inventions covered by IP and IT but step in to cover the lower
tail of ideas not covered by IP. ICs make adjustments to contracts to
address the particular problem of creating and using knowledge.
Technological change favoring intangible assets and interoperability
makes ICs highly valuable and perhaps more commonly used than
traditional contracts. The many types of IC identified here play an
increasingly important role in fostering technological advances.
IC rules help resolve the debate over whether IP or IT is best for
protecting the interests of inventors. Technological change requires
cooperative investments in invention, innovation, and adoption. ICs
protect the expectation interests of parties engaged in technological
change: employer and employee, firm and subcontractor, and licensor
and licensee. ICs not only protect inventors who make discoveries, but
also innovators who apply those discoveries and adopters who demand
innovations. ICs generate gains from trade that increase joint benefits for
inventors, innovators, and adopters. When there are gains from trade, the
inventor's returns from entering into an IC are greater than returns from
either their own use of IP or an assignment to others. Because of gains
from trade, ICs increase the benefits of inventors beyond what can be
achieved with only IP and IT. Legal protections for inventors, innovators,
and adopters thus cannot be based solely on a combination of IT and IP.
Greater emphasis on IC rules by the courts within the Intellectual Law
framework proposed here would address problems with both IT and IP.
I also devise the new term Intellectual Tort to designate liability rules
governing the taking or infringement of intangible assets. IT includes
misappropriation of trade secrets, and infringement of patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. I argue that IC rules help disentangle IT rules
from IP rules and overcome the shortcomings of IT rules. Many
practitioners and scholars emphasize liability protections against
infringement. 24 Daniel Crane introduces the term "Intellectual Liability"
to identify the shift toward liability protections: "Instead of speaking
about 'intellectual property,' it may be more appropriate to speak about

24. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, PurgingPatentLaw of "PrivateLaw "Remedies, 92 TEx. L.
REV. 517, 519 (2013) ("[P]atent remedies mirror traditional tort law remedies by attempting to
restore the patentee to the status quo ante-namely, the state of the world in which there is no
infringement of the patent.").
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'intellectual rights' consisting in part of intellectual property rights and
in part of intellectual liability rights." 25
Damage remedies based on IT, however, can fail to fully compensate
IP owners or to deter infringement. In contrast, IC rules support
agreements between IP owners and users that can both prevent
infringement and resolve infringement disputes without the need for
courts to determine compensation. When infringement does occur, the
courts can use IC rules as a framework for calculating reasonable royalty
damages, as I argue elsewhere. 26 Thus, IC rules complement IT rules by
helping deter infringement and determine reasonable royalties that are
compensatory.
Technological change is altering the nature of contract. ICs provide
agreements needed to achieve technological change, both within the firm
and among firms. I suggest that ICs have five important features that
distinguish them from standard contracts involving tangible assets.
First, ICs address the lack of completeness in ownership of intangible
assets. An important strength of ICs is that they help protect the vast set
of property interests that standard IP does not cover. The four main
categories of IP-trade secrets, patents, trademarks, and copyrights-do
not fully cover commercial, scientific, and technological creations. IP is
subject to challenges of validity and imperfect enforcement against
infringement. 27 Additionally, IP typically has significant registration
requirements in comparison to tangible property. 2 8 USPTO patent and
trademark applications must satisfy various regulatory criteria, which
entail substantial legal costs in addition to the filing fees. 29 The U.S.
Copyright Office registers copyrights subject to various restrictions on
types of works of authorship and subject matter.3 0

25. See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEx. L. REv. 253, 254 (2009)
("Innovation incentives, once protected by property rights, are increasingly being protected by
liability rights.").
26. See Spulber, supra note 18.
27. John C. Paul et al., Courts May Enforce Covenants Not to Challenge the Validity of
Licensed Patents Containedin a License Agreement Settling Litigation When the PartiesClearly
Waived Future Challenges to Validity, FINNEGAN (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.finnegan.com/
en/insights/courts-may-enforce-covenants-not-to-challenge-the-validity-of.html.
28. F. Scott Kieff, The Casefor RegisteringPatentsand the Law and Economics of Present
Patent-ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 123 (2003) ("The case for an alternative model
registration system also is helpful in showing why increased scrutiny of patent applications would

worsen, not improve, the present system's performance.").
29. Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the U.S., IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/; see
Rebecca Tushnet, RegisteringDisagreement:Registrationin Modern American TrademarkLaw,
130 HARV. L. REv. 867 (2017).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
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Second, ICs remedy problems of exclusion of access to intangible
assets because ICs help determine how parties will share the returns and
control over intangible assets. Without contracts, it can be difficult to
protect intangible assets. The law treats tangible and intangible property
differently because IP limits exclusivity, transferability, and duration of
ownership. 3 1 Various court cases, statutes, and administrative decisions
have weakened legal protections for IP. Although the Patent Act gives
patents "the attributes of personal property," these protections are
incomplete. 32 The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. that "the creation of a right is distinct from the
provision of remedies for violations of that right." 3 3 Physical barriers
provide limited protection because knowledge is readily transferable and
easy to imitate or appropriate. Secrecy may not be feasible because
offering IP for sale or license requires disclosing the knowledge. Using
IP within an organization and with business partners also requires
continual sharing of knowledge.
Third, ICs handle non-rivalrous usage of intangible assets, a problem
that generally does not arise with tangible assets. Intangible assets can
provide services to multiple users at once. 34 ICs such as license and
cross-license agreements provide access to intangible assets for multiple
users and handle in-kind exchanges of access to intangible assets. ICs can
bundle intangible assets such as licenses for patent portfolios, as well as
bundle intangible assets with tangible assets, goods, and services. ICs
also can unbundle intangible assets by specifying conditions of use
through the grant of rights.
Fourth, ICs address problems in designing incentives for what I refer
to here as "exploratory performance." An IC must monitor and reward
the agent's performance in exploring uncharted waters. By its very
nature, technological change is a leap into the unknown. Economic
analysis identifies agency costs that arise from difficulties in observing
an agent's hidden actions or hidden information. 3 5 Contracts must be
based on performance because outputs are observable and verifiable
while inputs are not. The design of an IC, however, encounters difficulties
in determining performance targets and observing performance. It is hard
31. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property:
True Love or Doomed Relationship, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 713, 747 (2007); Peter S. Menell,
IntellectualProperty and the Property Rights Movement, 30 REG. 36, 39 (2007).

32. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 261 (2018).

33. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
34. There is non-rivalrous usage of some types of tangible assets if demand is constrained
below the capacity of the asset. For example, there is non-rivalrous usage of a bridge or a park if
demand is less than capacity and there are no congestion externalities. See Chizoba Mora, How Is
Computer Software Classified as an Asset?, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2018, 11:50 AM),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/computer-software-intangible-asset.asp.
35. Epstein, supra note 10, at 6.
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to know what the outcomes of invention, innovation, and technology
adoption will be. This presents a greater challenge than traditional agency
costs. This also makes it difficult to determine the intent of the parties as
well as to find remedies for breach of contract. ICs provide incentives for
exploration by rewarding measures of performance that are observable
and verifiable rather than inventive effort.
Fifth, ICs provide mechanisms for addressing fundamental
uncertainty associated with invention, innovation, and adoption.
Technological change involves particular types of statistical, discovery,
creativity, and market uncertainty. This uncertainty distinguishes ICs
from standard contracts involving routine activities and risky investments
in tangible assets. Fundamental uncertainty generates benefits from
contingent contracting. 36 An IC must address the well-known trade-off
between the benefits and costs of contingent contracts. 37 Contract law and
the costs of contracting provide incentives for simple contract forms. 3 8
ICs offer basic mechanisms such as royalties and options that address the
uncertainties of technological change. 39
I identify five main types of ICs: employment, outsourcing, joint
venture and consortium, license, and platform. Finns enter into
employment contracts with scientific and technical personnel who
conduct invention and innovation within the firm. Firms use outsourcing
contracts with specialist firms and supply chain management companies
that develop inventions and innovations. Firms form joint venture and
consortium contracts to establish research joint ventures (RJVs) and
R&D consortia. Joint venture and consortium contracts allow firms to
share the costs, risks, and outputs of invention and innovation. Finns
create license contracts for usage of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and
business knowledge. Finally, firms apply platform contracts that bring
together providers and adopters of technology. Firms enter into platform
contracts with for-profit intermediaries and with cooperative institutions
such as patent pools and other Collective Rights Organizations (CROs).4 0

36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting 2-31
(John M. Olin Center for Stud. In L., Econ., & Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. 264, 2001)
("Contract law encourages courts to search thoroughly for the parties' actual intentions in creating
the contract and in renegotiating it. We show that this search has yielded mandatory legal rules
that make it extremely difficult for parties to restrict renegotiation, and that can increase greatly
the cost of creating sophisticated contracts. As a consequence, parties now have legal incentives
to use the more simple contract forms . . . ").
39. Joaquin Poblete & Daniel Spulber, Managing Innovation: Optimal Incentive Contracts
for DelegatedR&D with Double Moral Hazard, 95 EUR. EcON. REv. 38 (June 2017).
40. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1358 (1996).
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I. INTELLECTUAL LAW

Developing the Intellectual Law framework requires a coherent
treatment of invention, innovation, and technology adoption. However,
legal protections for intangible assets are a mixture of property and tort.
Applications of property and tort to intangible assets fail to address
consent in a consistent way. As a consequence, these protections fail to
perform effectively both property and tort functions. Recognizing the
widespread use of various forms of ICs would help bring consistency to
Intellectual Law because it addresses the key question of consent for
agreements involving intangible assets. Courts can apply ICs to improve
legal protections for the creation and application of intangible assets.
A. The Conflict Between IT and IP
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed distinguish between property
and tort in terms of who has consent. 4 1 Protections are based on property
if the owner's consent to sell is necessary for transfers. 4 2 Protections are
based on tort if the taker's consent to buy is sufficient for transfers. 43 This
is because someone taking the asset determines whether they want to pay
compensation by choosing to infringe. The liability rule effectively
removes the owner's consent to sell, whether or not the taking is
intentional.4 4 The distinction between property and tort rules provides
clarity for tangible assets that may be absent for intangible assets.
Legal protections for intangible assets-currently based on a
haphazard combination of IT and IP-are incomplete because they do not
address consent in a consistent way. Protections for intangible assets are
based partly on IT because damage remedies remove the IP owner's
consent to sell an intangible asset. Damage remedies make the infringer's
consent to buy sufficient for ongoing transfers. Based on this perspective,
some have characterized patent infringement as a "strict liability" tort. 45
41. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) ("An entitlement
is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement
from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.... Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement
if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a
liability rule. This value may be what it is thought the original holder of the entitlement would

have sold it for.").
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Richard A. Epstein, The Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property

Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997) ("[A] liability rule denies the holder of the asset the
power to exclude others or, indeed, to keep the asset for himself.").
45. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proofof Copying?, 105 MICH.

&

L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2006) ("Patent infringement is a strict liability offense."); Roger Blair
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Following this approach to patent infringement, various limitations on
strict liability would further reduce protections for inventions. 46
Protections for intangible assets are based partly on IP because the IP
owner has some rights to exclude and so must consent to license or sell
an intangible asset. 47 However, IP rights often limit exclusivity, again
removing the IP owner's consent to sell. 4 8
The Supreme Court's unanimous eBay decision illustrates the mixture
of property and tort approaches. 49 Problems arise because the Court did
not address consent in a consistent way. The eBay decision has created
some confusion by conflating IT and IP.5 0 The Court in eBay weakens IP
in comparison to tangible property by reducing the consent of the IP
owner as seller. 5 1 The infringer's consent as buyer can dominate the IP
owner's consent as seller, converting property remedies to tort remedies.
The eBay decision limits injunctions for intangible assets by applying
the four-factor test for issuing injunctions to patent infringement. 52 The
first factor, irreparable harm, is a particularly high hurdle for the IP
owner. Second, requiring the IP owner to show that remedies are
inadequate compensation is an additional burden that replaces IP with IT
rules. Third, consideration of the balance of hardships between plaintiff
and defendant differs substantially from property rights in tangible assets.
Consideration of the balance of hardships combines the IP owner's
consent as seller with the infringer's consent as buyer. Finally, the public
interest criterion places IP rights in a different category from tangible
property.
Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
799, 800 (2002) [hereinafter Blair & Cotter, Strict Liability] ("Patent infringement is a strict
liability tort in the sense that a defendant may be liable without having had any notice, prior to

the filing of an infringement action, that her conduct was infringing."); Roger Blair & Thomas F.
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of DamagesRules in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1585 (1998).
46. Blair & Cotter, Strict Liability, supra note 45, at 806 (suggesting that liability need not
be considered strict because in some cases giving notice is required for liability).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 388, 393 ("The traditional four-factor test applied by courts of equity when
considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies to
disputes arising under the Patent Act. That test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.... [A] permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have

been adjudged.").
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Andrew Beckerman-Rodau observes that eBay is "part of a broad
attack on the current U.S. patent system." 5 3 David McGowan argues that
the Court in eBay "reversed the longstanding presumption in favor of
permanent injunctive relief for proven patent infringement." 54 Evidence
suggests that post-eBay district courts continue to grant permanent
injunctions.5 5 Injunctions are more likely when the IP owner competes
with the infringer. 56
Richard Epstein argues against exclusively using damages for
infringement of IP in the absence of the possibility of injunctive relief.57
Infringement would then function as a viable option for the infringer,
potentially leading to excessive infringement.5 8 Epstein compares
damages for infringement to the general problem of damages for breach
of contract. 5 9 He criticizes the "efficient breach" approach when
expectation damages are the only remedy for breach of contract. 60
Without the possibility of injunctive relief, expectation damages function
as an option for the party contemplating breach, which may reduce
incentives to contract. 61
The courts' standard approach to resolving patent infringement
disputes further illustrates the mixture of property and tort. Courts
typically apply the "hypothetical negotiation" approach to calculating
reasonable royalty damages. 62 The hypothetical negotiation approach
combines property and tort because it tries to imagine both what a willing
licensor would accept and what a willing licensee would accept. 63 The
53. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in
Interpretingthe Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 165, 165 (2007).
54. David McGowan, IrreparableHarm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577, 579 (2010).
55. See Rachel M. Janutis, The Supreme Court's UnremarkableDecision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597, 601, 604 (2010); Benjamin Peterson,
Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 193, 196 (2008); Douglas Ellis
et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of ObtainingPermanent Injunctive Relief
After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B. J. 437, 441 (2008).
56. Janutis, supra note 55, at 605.
57. Epstein, supra note 10, at 5.
58. Id. at 24.

59. Id. at 6-8.
59. Id.
61. Id. at 24-25.
62. John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable
Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 772 (2013) ("[T]he
hypothetical negotiation construct was originally introduced simply as one of many considerations
to estimate such damages. It has since evolved into the primary tool used to determine reasonable
royalty damages.").
63. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

("The [willing buyer and willing seller] rule is more a statement of approach than a tool of
analysis. It requires consideration not only of the amount that a willing licensee would have paid

for the patent license but also of the amount that a willing licensor would have accepted.").
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acceptance of the willing licensor is the property side of the law and the
acceptance of the willing licensee is the tort side of the law. So, the
hypothetical negotiation tries to simultaneously satisfy property and tort
remedies.
The hypothetical negotiation, however, may fail to satisfy both
property and tort remedies. One reason for this is that the hypothetical
benefit to the infringer may be less than the hypothetical harm to the
patent holder. If the infringer's benefit from adopting the technology is
less than the patent holder's cost of providing the technology, there is no
basis for an economically efficient transaction. The transaction would
yield negative net benefits.
If the infringer's benefit from adopting the technology is less than the
cost to the patent holder of providing the technology, there is no royalty
that would support an exchange. The patent holder would not give
consent as seller for any royalty that does not cover the cost of providing
the technology because the royalty would not be compensatory. So, the
hypothetical negotiation would not protect property interests.
Conversely, the infringer would not consent as buyer to any royalty
that would be greater than the benefits of implementing the technology.
The patent holder thus would not be compensated for the damages from
infringement. So, the hypothetical negotiation would not satisfy tort
requirements.
Further, the hypothetical negotiation also fails to provide either
property or tort remedies because it undertakes the impossible task of
determining the property owner's expectations and the infringer's
expectations before infringement occurs. 64 This requires knowledge not
available to either the patent holder or the infringer, let alone the court.
The passage of time and the resolution of uncertainty will change the
infringer's benefit from infringement and the patent holder's damages
from infringement. Damages based on the hypothetical negotiation are
unlikely to reflect either the patent holder's cost as seller or the infringer's
benefit as buyer.
The courts apply two damages calculations that are subject to similar
problems. 65 First, the "bottom-up" approach calculates reasonable royalty
damages as a share of the infringer's benefit based on the incremental
value of the patents to the infringer. 66 This approach requires not only
determining the infringer's direct valuation of the patented technology,
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining RAND Royalty Rates for
Standard-EssentialPatents, 29 ANTITRUST 86, 88 (2014) ("The bottom-up approach is consistent
with the conceptual definition of RAND and is commonly performed in patent infringement

cases.").
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but also the valuation of the best alternative. 67 Second, the "top-down"
approach is based on marking down the infringer's profit and
apportioning that profit among multiple technologies. 6 8 The top-down
approach appears in In re Innovatio and TCL Communications v.
Ericsson.69
Both of these damage calculations are based on the infringer's
benefits. 70 The two methods represent tort solutions to patent
infringement because they are sufficient to insure the infringer's consent
as buyer for ongoing infringement. These methods may not necessarily
be compensatory, however, because the awarded damages may be less
than the patent holder's costs-even if the patent holder's costs are less
than the infringer's benefits. These methods are a shift from IP to IT
because they tend to remove the owner's consent as seller.
B. UntanglingIT and IP
IC rules provide guidance in untangling IT and IP. Private agreements
should be more efficient than outcomes created by courts because the
parties know more about their situation than do the courts. Transaction
costs can reduce the efficiency of private agreements, but such costs tend
to be lower than litigation costs.
The courts can untangle IT from IP by separating compensation from
injunction. An IC protects the expectations of the parties to the
agreement. If an IC is breached, it is necessary to compensate the injured
party for harm caused by the breach. The courts should at least provide
compensation to owners of IP for infringement that has already occurred.
The damages to IP owners should include all of the economic costs due
to the infringement, including transaction costs. The damages also can be
tripled if the infringer engaged in "egregious infringement behavior. "71
67. Id.

68. Id. at 89.
69. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 11-C-9308, 2013 WL 5593609
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2012); TCL Commc'ns Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktenbologet LM
Ericsson, No. SACV 14-00341 JVS (ANx), 2016 WL 4150033 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016); see
Jason Rantanen, TCL v. Ericsson: The First Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision,
PATENTLYO
(Dec.
27,
2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/12/contreras-ericssondecision.html; Richard Vary, Supersize This: UnwiredPlanetAmericanStyle, BIRD & BIRD (Dec.
2017),
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/global/supersize-this-unwired-planetamerican-style.
70. Leonard & Lopez, supranote 66, at 86-87.
71. See Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs. Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1925 (2016); Stryker Corp. v.
Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 661 (Fed. Cir. 2015); George W. Jordan III, Halo v. Pulse: A New
Chapter for Willfulness and Enhanced Patent Damages, LANDSLIDE (Mar.-Apr. 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual-property_1aw/publications/landslide/2016
-17/march-april/halo-v-pulse-new-chapter willfulnessandenhanced-patent-damages/.
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The courts should not necessarily rely on compensation for
infringement that has not yet occurred. Forward-looking damages give
the infringer consent as the buyer and remove the owner's consent as the
seller. This approach weakens IP and leads to an inefficient appropriation
of technology. Instead, courts should impose an injunction when
necessary to prevent future infringement. 72 This restores the consent of
the owner of the intangible asset.
An injunction not only mitigates future harm but provides incentives
for the parties to negotiate an IC. If the benefit to the infringer is greater
than the cost to the owner, the parties benefit from an IC; an injunction
should thus lead to an IC. If the benefit to the infringer is less than the
cost to the owner, then the parties will not benefit from an IC, but an
injunction will stop the infringement. Injunctions protect the IP rights of
the owners of the intangible assets by restoring their consent as seller.
Infringement is technology transfer in the absence of an IC.
Infringement represents a failure to contract, whether or not infringement
is intentional.73 Failure to reach a contractual agreement combined with
continued usage of the intangible asset is likely to lead to an infringement
dispute. An IC prevents the infringement dispute and can also resolve an
infringement dispute after it has already begun.
IC rules also help calculate damage remedies for infringement. Rather
than imagining the situation of the parties before infringement began, it
is necessary to determine the actual harm from infringement. As I discuss
in detail elsewhere, the court in a patent case gathers evidence that fills
in many of the terms of a patent license agreement.7 4 The evidence
includes the identity of the parties, their business relationship, and the
nature of the IP being transferred. The evidence indicates the extent of
the infringement and helps determine the harm to the owner of the
intangible assets.
In infringement disputes, courts should construct what I have referred
to elsewhere as an "informed contract." 7 5 This approach is consistent with
IC rules and replaces the flawed hypothetical negotiation. The informed
contract builds on the information revealed by the patent case to estimate
the harm to the patent holder. The patent holder's lost profits and
reasonable damages should be based on infringement that actually
occurred. Courts should not attempt the impossible task of constructing
imagined expectations for a negotiation that did not occur.

72. 35 U.S.C.

§ 283 (2018) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title

may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any

right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.").
73. Spulber, supranote 18, at 21.
74. Spulber, supranote 18, at 7.
75. Spulber, supranote 18, at 3.
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In determining damages for infringement, the IC approach suggests
that courts should use royalties from comparable ICs. These royalties
from comparable license contracts should be adjusted based on
information revealed by the patent case. In particular, royalties should
reflect the increase in market value of a license that comes with a patent
found to be valid and infringed upon. Royalties for Standard Essential
Patents (SEPs) should reflect the added market value of the patent license
that is revealed by inclusion of the patent in technology standards chosen
by a Standard Setting Organization (SSO). Other characteristics of
patents can raise or lower the market value of licenses and can be used to
adjust royalties from comparable licenses.
If there are no comparable patent licenses, reasonable royalty damages
can be estimated by using the market prices of patents. I have spelled out
the "market value method" of calculating reasonable royalty damages.7 6
The market prices of patents provide information about expected returns
from own use and total royalties from multiple licensing agreements.
These can be apportioned among infringers to determine the royalties that
would have been received but for the infringement.
IT, or liability for infringement, does not offer sufficient legal support
for technological change. IT does little to deter infringement of ideas and
provides no guidelines for cooperative agreements. Technological
change cannot depend only on compensating patent holders for
infringement. Although recovery of lost profits or reasonable royalty
damages may serve as remedies for infringement, this is not sufficient to
induce cooperative investment in creating and applying new ideas. IP
protections are necessary to preserve incentives to form ICs, thus
protecting expectation interests.
C. ICs and the "Marketfor Innovative Control"
IC rules help resolve the ongoing debate over whether IP or IT
provides the best protections for inventors. The protection of the interests
of inventors depends on the combination of property, tort, and contract
rules. ICs generate gains from trade for all parties, thus enhancing the
benefits for inventors beyond what IP and IT protections can provide. ICs
complement IP and IT protections by supporting commercialization and
cooperative investment.
ICs are the main transaction method for what I have termed the
"market for innovative control." 7 7 ICs allocate both returns from
intangible assets and rights of control over innovation using those assets.
76. Spulber, supra note 18, at 7 (describing the "market value method" of calculating
reasonably royalty damages).
77. Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Market for
Inventions, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 271, 274 (2015).
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ICs protect the continual stream of discoveries and extensive sharing of
knowledge required for cooperative investment. ICs involve investment
in disembodied technology as well as technology embodied in goods and
services. The characteristics of technological change suggest increased
usage of ICs in comparison to standard contracts. Investment continues
to shift away from tangible assets and toward intangible assets. Virtual
inventions and innovations represent a shift away from hardware
innovations and toward software innovations.7 8 For example,
improvements in products, production processes, and business methods
may take the form of software upgrades rather than new equipment with
improved capabilities. Such innovation will take the form of intangible
assets. Technology transfers and upgrades will require ICs that protect
expectation interests and IP.
Technological change that increases connectivity and knowledge
sharing may require new types of contract provisions. Innovations in loT
involve a significant increase in connectivity among firms as well as
between firms and customers. The International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) defines the loT as: "A global infrastructure for the
information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting
(physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable
information and communication technologies." 7 9 According to the ITU,
"The loT is expected to greatly integrate leading technologies, such as
technologies related to advanced machine-to-machine communication,
autonomic networking, data mining and decision-making, security and
privacy protection, and cloud computing, with technologies for advanced
sensing and actuation." 80 The ITU identifies various types of business
roles in JoT, including providers of platforms, networks, devices, and
applications.8 1 These business roles are likely to require ICs.
Advances in Al also suggest greater use of ICs. Employees and
managers working with Al will jointly generate knowledge and
inventions. It will be necessary to specify how to monitor and reward the
performance of employees and managers who interact with Al systems.
It will also be necessary to determine inventions and innovations created
by employees that work with Al systems. Related considerations apply
to contractual relationships between firms that involve Al systems. It may
be necessary to specify performance in terms of both the activities of
individuals and Al systems.
78. MNItRE ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
79. INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET
PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS (June 2012), https://www.itu.int/rec/

dologin-pub.asp?ang=e&id=T-REC-Y.2060-201206-I!!PDF-E&type=items.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 4.
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The market for innovative control depends on the broad framework of
Intellectual Law. Protections for IP rights and other aspects of IP improve
the efficiency of transactions in the market for innovative control.8 2
Extending and enhancing these traditional protections, ICs allocate
residual returns and residual control rights from IP and support
cooperative investment in invention, innovation, and adoption. ICs are
important for innovation by established firms and entrepreneurs because
they protect the expectation interests of inventors, innovators, and
adopters. ICs thus support cooperative agreements to develop and apply
technology. These agreements increase the benefits of inventors beyond
what they could obtain through own use and transfers of inventions. So,
ICs promote the interests of inventors beyond what property or liability
rules alone could achieve.
Efficient economic activity depends on a combination of contractual
agreements and property rights. Contractual agreements require
well-defined property rights for tangible assets that provide
completeness, exclusivity, and transferability. In turn, owners of tangible
property, including land, structures, inventory, and capital equipment,
cannot realize the full economic value of those assets simply from own
use and transfer of assets to others. Property owners need contracts that
support cooperation over time and investment in tangible assets. A
market system requires contracts for employment, production,
construction, procurement, distribution, and finance.
Technological change also depends on a combination of contractual
agreements and property rights. IP provides the foundation of the market
for innovative control by improving efficiency and gains from trade from
ICs. However, even a well-functioning IP system is not sufficient to
protect the interests of inventors, innovators, and adopters. Owners of IP
cannot rely only on own-use and transfers of IP. ICs allocate both residual
returns and residual rights of control over how inventions are developed
and applied to generate innovations. Through ICs such as licensing
agreements, patent holders and technology adopters determine how
technology will be applied. Finns require ICs to form agreements with
employees, suppliers, partners, distributors, investors, and customers.
ICs differ from standard contracts because the characteristics of
intangible assets differ from those of tangible assets. Finns form ICs with
managers and specialized employees to carry out invention, innovation,
and adoption. Firms form ICs with other firms to outsource R&D and to
share inventions and innovations. The development and application of
inventions and innovations require cooperative investment to create and
develop intangible assets. ICs realize many benefits that are beyond the
reach of own use or immediate exchange of intangible assets.
82. Spulber, supranote 77.
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An IC involves those intangible assets associated with invention,
innovation, and adoption. Not all intangible assets are related to
technological change. 83 According to the International Accounting
Standards (IAS) 38, "An intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary
asset without physical substance. Such an asset is identifiable when it is
separable, or when it arises from contractual or other legal rights.
Separable assets can be sold, transferred, licensed, etc." 84 The legal rights
and obligations in a contract also are intangible assets, but not all
contracts are ICs.8 5
The market for innovative control allocates both returns of innovation
and control over innovative investment decisions. The market for
technology resembles the stock market, which allocates both residual
returns and residual rights of control over corporate investment decisions.
The market for innovative control includes licensing and cross-licensing
agreements for IP and specialized agreements to develop and apply
inventions and innovations over time. The market for innovative control
also includes the transfer of intangible assets and the sale of inventions
and innovations that are embodied in goods and services. The market for
innovative control further includes mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that
transfer ownership of corporations' intangible assets. The market for
innovative control also encompasses financing of invention and
innovation, including venture capital. 8 6
Despite its limitations, IP improves transaction efficiencies in the
market for innovative control. In addition to exclusivity and
transferability, IP reduces transaction costs and improves the efficiency
of contracts by offering disclosure, certification, standardization, and
divisibility. 87 IP provides a basis for licensing, cross-licensing, and other

83. IAS 38 Intangible Assets, DELOITTE, https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias38
(last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (Examples of intangible assets include: "[Platented technology,
computer software, databases and trade secrets; trademarks, trade dress, newspaper mastheads,
internet domains; video and audiovisual material (e.g. motion pictures, television programmes);
customer lists; mortgage servicing rights; licensing, royalty and standstill agreements; import
quotas; franchise agreements; customer and supplier relationships (including customer
lists); marketing rights.").
84. IAS 38 Intangible Assets, INT'L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDs
FOUND.,
https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-38-intangible-assets/ (last visited Feb.
9, 2019).
85. Robert F. Reilly, Valuation of Contract-Related Intangible Assets, THE PRACTICAL
LAWYER, Dec. 2013, at 37, 38, http://www.willamette.com/pubs/presentations3/reilly
contractjintangibles-tpl2013.pdf ("The contract document (or the oral agreement) itself is not the
intangible asset. The legal rights and duties of the contract are the intangible asset.").
86. See DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEUR 27-29 (2014).
87. Daniel F. Spulber, Public Prizes Versus Market Prices: Should Contests Replace
Patents?, 97 JPAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 690 (2015).
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ICs. IP supports ICs involving the joint development and allocation of
inventions and innovations.
Robert Merges emphasizes the general contributions of property to
contracting, and these contributions are particularly applicable to IP. 8
Merges points out that property provides "precontractual liability," which
protects the disclosure of information before a contract is formed.8 9
Merges further observes that property provides "enforcement flexibility"
after a contract is formed. 90 Merges emphasizes the importance of this
interaction between contract and property with modular production and
specialized firms. 91
IP enhances coordination in contractual relationships. Scott Kieff
emphasizes that patents "facilitate investment in the complex, costly, and
risky commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions into
new goods and services." 92 Kieff observes that "This commercialization
approach sees property rights in IP serving a role akin to beacons in the
dark, drawing to themselves all of those potential complementary users
of the IP-protected-asset to interact with the IP owner and each other." 93
Kieff argues that the coordination provided by IP leads to contracts: "This
helps them each explore through the bargaining process the possibility of
striking contracts with each other." 94
IP generates economic benefits by supporting market transactions
rather than simply own use of intangible assets. A report by the
Economics and Statistics Administration and the USPTO frames the
benefits of IP in terms of economic activities:

88. Robert P. Merges, A TransactionalView of PropertyRights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477 (2005).
89. Id. at 1488.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1514-19.
92. F. Scott Kieff, PropertyRights and PropertyRules for CommercializingInventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2000); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function ofthe Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of
Patents,71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2004); Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 508 (2005).
93. Email from the Honorable F. Scott Kieff, Comm'r, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, to U.S.
Fed. Trade Comm'n & Dep't of Justice, (Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Kieff, FTC & DoJ Joint
IP-AT Guidelines Email], https://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/2016/09/30/comment-

00006 (expressing his views on the United States Federal Trade Commission's and the United
States Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Joint Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property); see also F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of
IntellectualProperty, 73 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 174, 179 (2004).
94. Kieff, FTC & DoJ Joint IP-AT Guidelines Email, supra note 93.
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*

Providing incentives to invent and create;

*

Protecting innovators from unauthorized copying;

*

Facilitating vertical specialization in technology
markets;

*

Creating a platform for financial investments in
innovation;

*

Supporting
entrepreneurial
liquidity
IPOs;
and
acquisitions,
mergers,

*

Supporting licensing-based
models; and

*

Enabling a more efficient market for trading in
technology and know-how. 95

technology

through
business

Notice that each of these economic activities is based on parties forming
ICs, including invention, innovation, finance, licensing, and transactions
in the market for technology.
Conversely, IP owners rely on ICs for the development,
commercialization, and application of intangible assets. The increasing
importance of technological change in the economy has generated a
burgeoning market for innovative control.9 6 Owners of intangible assets
not only obtain a stream of returns, but also have rights of control over
inventions, innovations, and adoption. The market value of intangible
assets is the present value of the stream of returns and control rights.
IC relationships provide mechanisms of commercialization for IP
holders. Raymond Nimmer points out that "commercialization, which
depends on contractual relationships, constitutes one of the core
mechanisms by which information is developed and distributed. It is a
central part of intellectual property law 'bargain' and should be
recognized as such." 9 7 Nimmer observes: "Only the most naive observer,
or one with a clear political agenda, can look at the intellectual property
laws and their history and suggest that policy in the property sphere
trumps or precludes the influence of contract." 98 For example, contracts
95. JUSTIN ANTONIPILLAI & MICHELLE K. LEE, USPTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE

U.S. EcoNoMy: 2016 UPDATE 3 (last visited Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept20l6.pdf.
96. Spulber, supranote 77, at 6.
97. Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and
Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 888 (1998). Nimmer also states that
"property rights are routinely transferred, waived, released and licensed. Contracts provide the

means for the development and commercial exploitation of information assets." Id. at 830.
98. Id. at 827.
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such as online "click-wrap" agreements provide "private ordering" for
information and knowledge sharing. 99
Because antitrust policy generally targets anti-competitive conduct
rather than ownership rights, antitrust policy toward innovation
correspondingly targets anti-competitive conduct rather than ownership
of intangible assets. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) both recognize that IP owners
depend on contracts to realize the benefits from intangible assets. 100 The
title of the DOJ and FTC policy thus addresses a type of IC rather than
IP: "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property."10 1
Further, the Antitrust Guidelines acknowledge the central importance of
contracts when dealing with IP: "The owner of intellectual property has
to arrange for its combination with other necessary factors to realize its
commercial value."

102

ICs and IP perform different economic functions, although both have
present values. An IC can be described as a joint investment project that
generates a stream of returns over time and is subject to uncertainty. An
immediate exchange of IP involves the transfer of a bundle of rights that
generates a stream of returns over time that is subject to uncertainty. In
both cases, the stream of returns over time refers to the stream of revenues
minus costs at each date.
An IC provides a mechanism for cooperation over time to implement
technological change. An IC spells out the performance of activities
involved in technological change. Adjusting investment over time in light
of new information increases the expected value of investment projects
in comparison to projects that do not adjust investment levels. 10 3
As with contracts generally, an IC protects the expectation interests of
the parties and provides incentives for investment. Because contracts are
voluntary, the parties only enter into an IC if they anticipate benefits from

99. See Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contractby Any OtherName Is Still a Contract:Examining
the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 122 (2005)
(discussing the relationship between contracts and IP); David Friedman, In Defense of Private
Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151, 1152 (1998); J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately
LegislatedIntellectualPropertyRights: Reconciling Freedom of Contractwith Public Good Uses
of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 904 (1999); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?
PropertyRights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 115, 126 (1997).
100. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY 4 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/
1049793/ip-guidelines_2017.pdf.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY

2 (1994).
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the bargain. To benefit from the bargain, both parties must receive gains
from trade. The terms of the contract allocate gains from trade and define
future performance.
The parties' expectation interests refer to the anticipation of benefits
in the future. A contract protects a party's expectation interests if the
party realizes the value of the contract, even if the promised performance
does not occur. The legal use of the term "expectation" refers to the
parties' present value of future benefits from the contract. However, this
can differ from the use of the term "expectation" in the fields of
probability and statistics.
The present value of a contract depends on the discount rate and
expectations about uncertain outcomes. In the absence of uncertainty, the
total benefits of an IC equal the present value of the stream of future
returns discounted using the appropriate rate of interest. The parties to an
IC will divide the present discounted value of the stream of future returns.
The benefits of owning IP also equal the present discounted value of the
stream of future returns obtained by using and licensing the IP. In a
competitive market, the price of the IP should equal the present
discounted value of the stream of future returns. When uncertainty is
present, estimating the benefits of an IC and the benefits of owning IP
involve expectations about the resolution of uncertainty. Combined, the
discounting of future benefits and the expectation of the outcome of
uncertainty generate an expected present discounted value. 104
An IC enhances the value of IP because cooperation generates gains
from trade. The parties create additional economic value relative to ownuse or an immediate exchange of intangible assets. An IC protects the
expectation interests of both parties. Let V denote the present value of the
discounted stream of net benefits expected by parties forming an IC. Let
U denote the total opportunity costs of the parties, which equals the
present value of the discounted stream of expected benefits forgone.
Then, V- U denotes total gains from trade for the two parties entering an
IC.
Licensing agreements are a form of IC covering the usage of all types
of intangible assets: patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets.
Suppose that V is the net benefit of the licensee and suppose also that the
IP holder derives no additional benefits from the agreement. The benefit
V includes the returns to investment by the licensee in applying the
technology and returns to investment in complementary assets net of the
costs of investment. Suppose that the licensee has no opportunity costs
104. There are difficulties in forming expectations about future events. See discussion infra
Section IV. Also, calculating the expected present discounted value of a stream of benefits
requires adjusting either discount rates or the expected value of benefits to account for the costs
of risk. See Alexander A. Robichek & Stewart C. Myers, Conceptual Problems in the Use of
Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates, 21 J. FIN. 727, 727-30 (1966).
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and U is the opportunity cost of the IP owner. The licensee pays
compensation R that represents the present value of the expected stream
of royalty payments to the IP owner, which is less than the benefit of the
licensee and greater than the opportunity cost to the IP owner. License
royalties divide gains from trade V- U.
Expectation damages for breach of a patent license contract are based
on the royalties that the licensor would have received had the contract
been honored by the licensee. Expectation damages for breach of contract
generally protect the plaintiffs expectation.10 5 Economic analysis
suggests that expectation damages for breach of contract generate
efficient performance decisions and also induce efficient reliance
investment. 106

By protecting expectation interests, an IC provides incentives to invest
efficiently in invention, innovation, and adoption. Expectation damages
provide incentives for efficient investment in developing the invention
and in complementary assets as well. This is because parties choose
investment levels that maximize expected returns net of the costs of
investment. Maximization of expected returns net of the costs of
investment means that investment is chosen such that the expected
marginal return to investment equals the marginal cost of investment.
With only partial protections for expectation interests, a party to the
contract may not receive all of the expected returns to investment. This
implies that a party to the contract may not receive the expected marginal
returns to additional investment. This provides incentives for a
contracting party to choose an amount of investment below the efficient
level. Consequently, a contracting party would not choose an amount of
investment that maximizes expected returns net of the costs of
investment. So, protection of expectation interests is necessary for parties
to obtain the greatest possible gains from trade. ICs thus provide dynamic
105. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 562 n.32 (1977); lan R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 854, 864 n.31 (1978); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance,45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351,
352 (1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979);
Richard Craswell, ContractRemedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 629,630 (1988).
106. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1147 (1970); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures,
and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERs L. REV. 273, 286 (1970); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An
Introduction to the Economic Analysis of ContractRemedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 720-21
(1986); William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 15 RAND J. EcON. 39, 44 (1984).

INTELLECTUAL CONTRACTAND INTELLECTUAL LAW

2018]

25

efficiencies that protect and increase benefits to inventors, innovators,
and adopters.
IC rules are consistent with property protections for intangible assets.
There are two main forms of legal protection for patent holders. Federal
law protects the patent holder from infringement of IP rights by enforcing
exclusion. 107 State law protects patent holders from infringement that
results from breach of contract. 108 Phillip Jones points out that "the
licensor may have the option to seek a remedy for a license restriction
breach under the contract or from a patent infringement suit." 109 Jones
concludes that "[i]n fact, a licensor may be able to obtain the same range
of remedies in state court for the breach of a license agreement that the
licensor would be able to obtain in federal court for patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-85 (i.e., an injunction, compensatory damages,
and attorney fees)." 1 10
To illustrate how expectation damages affect breach decisions in
patent license contracts, suppose that a licensor expects to receive a
payment of R from the licensing agreement. For ease of discussion,
suppose that the licensor does not have any lost profits and does not incur
any licensing costs, although the discussion can readily be generalized
without changing the conclusions. Expectation damages for a licensee
breach of contract restore the licensor to the position he would be if the
contract had been honored. This implies that damages D equal the
payment R that the licensor would have received.
The damages remedy affects the licensee's contract breach decision.
Suppose that after the licensing contract is signed, the licensee develops
an alternative invention that generates net benefits Z. Alternatively, Z
could represent the market value of a new alternative invention net of
royalty payments. The licensee will breach the contract if and only if the
benefits of switching to the alternative technology net of switching costs
and contract damages are greater than the net benefits of honoring the
contract. This means that breach occurs if and only if the benefits of
adopting the new technology net of damages Z - D are greater than the
benefits V - R of the patented technology net of royalties.
Expectation damages equal the payment that the licensor expected to
receive. Netting out the damage payment and the corresponding royalty
payment, this implies that breach occurs if and only if the value Z
obtained from applying the alternative technology is greater than the
value V from the patented invention. This means that with expectation
107. 35 U.S.C.

§ 154 (2018).

108. Phillip B.C. Jones, Violation of a Patent License Restriction: Breach of Contractor
Patent Infringement?, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 225, 226 (1993) ("[A] patent licensing agreement

is a contract which is governed by principles of state contract law.").
109. Id.
110. Id. at 240, n.75.
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damages, breach of the licensing contract should occur if and only if
breach is efficient, that is, if Z is greater than V. So, expectation damages
for breach of licensing agreements provide incentives for efficient
technology adoption decisions.
When expectation damages are sufficient to protect the expectation
interests of the parties, the parties choose the terms of the agreement to
maximize the present value of expected benefits. Also, the parties choose
their investments to maximize the present value of total expected
benefits. In this way, an IC increases the benefits of IP owners in
comparison with immediate exchange and own use alone.
D. ICs and the Nature of the Firm
ICs are critical building blocks in the formation of innovative firms.
ICs are essential to the "creative destruction" that takes place when
innovative entrants compete with incumbent firms. Innovative firms
contract with specialized researchers within the firm to develop and
manage intangible assets. Innovative firms contract in the market with
firms that create, own, or apply intangible assets. Innovative firms use
ICs with customers, suppliers, partners, and distributors to introduce new
products, production processes, transaction methods, and organizational
structures. Innovative firms use ICs to provide multi-sided platforms that
offer marketmaking and intermediary services to customers and
suppliers.
Contracts are central to the formation of firms. The firm involves both
internal and external contractual relationships." The firm's collection of
internal and external contracts depends on the relative efficiency and
transaction costs of these types of contracts. Steven Cheung interprets
Ronald Coase's analysis of the firm in terms of contract: "It is not quite
correct to say that a 'firm' supersedes 'the market.' Rather, one type of
contract supersedes another type." 112
A major purpose of the firm is to organize and manage the market for
contracts. In my book The Theory of the Firm, I show that "[t]he firm is
111. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) ("[Firms]

serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals."); see Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Conception that the CorporationIs a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of
the Firm, 24 J. CoRP. L. 819, 828 (1998).
112. Steven N.S. Cheung, The ContractualNature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 10 (1983).
Cheung states that an input owner has the option of own-use, selling the input to others, or creating
a firm through contracts delegating the use of the input: "The firm emerges with the third option:
the entrepreneur or the agent who holds a limited set of use rights by contract directs production
activities without immediate reference to the price of each activity, and the commodities so
produced are then sold in the market." Id. at 3. See also Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
16 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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an intermediary in the market for contracts." 113 Entrepreneurs establish
firms when the benefits of intermediated contracts exceed the benefits of
direct exchange: "Firms offer advantages over bilateral contracts through
market making and coordination across multiple contracts." 114
IC relationships are essential to the creation of new types of firms. As
I discuss in my book The Innovative Entrepreneur, entrepreneurs
innovate to overcome the innovative inertia of incumbent firms.1 15
Entrepreneurs also innovate to overcome friction in the market for
inventions that limit transfers of their technology to incumbent firms. 116
Innovative entrepreneurs develop a complex set of contractual
relationships, necessarily including ICs, to create startups and establish
firms.
Contracts have well-known transaction costs, including the costs of
search, negotiation, moral hazard, adverse selection, monitoring
performance, and enforcement of contract terms. ICs have additional
transaction costs, including difficulties in pricing IP and the costs of
bundling IP with other goods and services. 117 Because of the fundamental
uncertainty involved in technological change, ICs have additional costs
of forming contingent agreements and monitoring outcomes. Uncertainty
associated with invention, innovation, and adoption is likely to be much
greater than with contracts involving tangible assets.1 18
The firm's outsourcing decisions concerning invention and innovation
also depend on the relative costs of forming and monitoring an
employment IC versus an outsourcing IC. The trade-off between
governance costs and market transaction costs for ICs is related to
Coase's analysis of the scope of the firm's activities and the make-or-buy
decision. 119 Coase's analysis applied to technological change suggests
that the firm will expand its inventive and innovative activities as long as
113. See

DANIEL F.

SPULBER,

THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS

WITH

ENDOGENOUs ENTREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKETS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 415 (2009).

114. Id.
115. See generally SPULBER, supra note 86.

116. Id.
117. See Richard Zeckhauser, The Challenge of Contractingfor TechnologicalInformation,
93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Scl. U.S. 12473, 12473 (1996) ("Contracting to provide technological
information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is
difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate
value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary
to 'give away the secret.' This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market
TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip
or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw

information. (iv) Sellers' superior knowledge about TI's value make buyers wary of overpaying.
(v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI.").
118. See discussion infra Section IV.
119. See generally Coase, supra 112.
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incremental governance costs are less than the transaction costs of
outsourcing these activities. 12 0
The trade-off between governance costs and transaction costs has
important implications for innovative firms. The use of ICs both within
the firm and among firms affects the direction of technological change.
The reductions in the extent of vertical integration of the firm affect how
R&D is organized in the economy. This is reflected in the design of
products and production processes. Firms have reduced vertical
integration by creating modular products and outsourcing contracts for
innovation. 121

The increasing importance of invention and innovation requires new
types of intangible assets and organizations. 122 Implementing
technological change requires contractual agreements. Connecting
individuals and firms in new ways requires more than networks of
innovative technologies with digital links; it is also necessary to connect
individuals and firms with networks of contracts that support the
formation of these new technological networks. Individuals and firms
need legal agreements for cooperative development of virtual inventions
and innovations, and to help develop interconnectivity and
interoperability of technologies. Individuals and firms also need contracts
that support data sharing and investment in data gathering and analytics.
Technological change leading to vertical disintegration requires
coordination through ICs between many vertical levels of suppliers.
Various technological developments cut across industries, leading to
greater reliance on outsourcing and licensing agreements. Technological
changes that cross industries include Al, loT, and ICT. 123
IC necessarily accompanies the growth of R&D outsourcing and the
formation of innovation networks. Firms substitute networks of contracts
120. Id.
121. See Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of
IndustrialOrganization,11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451,451 (2002); Carliss Y. Baldwin, Where
Do TransactionsCome From?Modularity, Transactions, and the Boundaries of Firms, 17 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 155, 161 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contractingfor Innovation: Vertical
Disintegrationand Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435 (2009) ("Contracting
for innovation supports iterative collaboration between firms by interweaving explicit and implicit
terms that respond to the uncertainty inherent in the innovation process . . . "); Margaret M. Blair
et al., Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, BYU L. REV. 263, 265-66 (2011).
122. Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Intangible Assets: Computers and OrganizationalCapital, 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 137, 138 (2002) ("This paper analytically explores the
hypothesis that new, intangible organizational assets complement [information technology]
capital just as new production processes and factory redesign complemented the adoption of

electric motors over 100 years ago.").
123. Kay Firth-Butterfield & Yoon Chae, Artificial Intelligence Collides with Patent Law,
CTR. FOR THE FOURTH INDUS. REVOLUTION 3, 5 (Apr. 2018) http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_48540_WPEndofInnovationProtectingPatentLaw.pdf.

2018]

INTELLECTUAL CONTRACTAND INTELLECTUAL LAW

29

for vertical integration. 124 Contracts among firms substitute for contracts
within the firm. Matthew Jennejohn observes, "[w]here property rights
no longer control, contracts substitute. In light of these developments,
contract's place as one of capitalism's fundamental building-blocks takes
on even greater importance."125
Many types of invention and innovation require coordination of
activities across firms. This is reflected in the increasing importance of
technological standards. There are over one thousand standard setting
organizations (SSOs) that establish quality and interoperability standards
in practically every industry. 126 Changes in technology standards provide
an important indication of innovation. 127 Standards include "variety
control, usability, compatibility, interchangeability, health, safety,
protection of the environment, product protection, mutual understanding,
economic performance, trade." 128 For example, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) has published over 21,000
international standards, 129 playing an important role in the formation of
global supply chains. The management literature refers to the extensive
technological
interdependence
among
firms
as
innovative
"ecosystems." 13 0
II. INTELLECTUAL CONTRACT
Intellectual Law offers a framework for addressing intangible assets
in a comprehensive manner. This section examines some of the main
differences between ICs and standard contracts; it also sets out five basic
principles of IC law. IC involves agreements that resolve some of the
incompleteness of IP. IC also helps remedy difficulties in exclusion of
access to intangible assets. IC provides agreements when there is
non-rivalrous usage of intangible assets. IC provides incentives for
124. Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and ContractDesign, 14 STAN. J.

L., Bus. & FIN. 83, 84 (2008) ("Rather, deverticalized firms enmesh themselves in webs of
collaboration-joint ventures, strategic alliances, just-in-time (JIT) production arrangements,
etc-usually in hope of cost-cutting but also with an eye to securing competitive advantage
through innovation.").
125. Id.
126. Daniel F. Spulber, Standard Setting Organizationsand Standard Essential Patents:
Voting and Markets 2 EcoN. J., (forthcoming, Apr. 2019), https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12606.
127. Id.
128. ISO/JEC GuIDE 2:2004 at 12 (INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT'L
ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM'N 2004), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:guide:2:ed8:vl:en.
129. INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, NAVIGATING A WORLD IN TRANSITION 35 (2016),

https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/about%201SO/annual-reports/en/annual report
2016_en.pdf.
130. See generally Ron Adner & Rahul Kapoor, Value Creation in Innovation Ecosystems:
How the Structure of Technological Interdependence Affects Firm Performance in New
Technology Generations, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 306 (2010).
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exploratory performance. Finally, IC addresses problems of contingent
contracting when agreements are subject to fundamental uncertainty.
A. ICs and Incompleteness of IP
IP suffers from weak enforcement as well as the inherent limitations
of government grants and registration. A well-functioning system of
property rights requires completeness, exclusivity, and transferability.
ICs provide protections for intangible assets based on agreements
between inventors, innovators, and adopters. This compensates for
incompleteness of legal protections for intangible assets. An advantage
of ICs is that they do not require government approval of the IP defined
through the agreement. The transaction costs of IC are likely to be
substantially lower than costs associated with government
administration. Contractually-defined protections are tailored to the
particular benefits and costs of the contracting parties and the
characteristics of the technology.
The Constitution frames protections for inventors in terms of IP by
giving Congress the power to secure exclusive rights for authors and
inventors to their writings and discoveries. 13 1 Patent holders have the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or
importing any patented invention. 132 State governments and all three
branches of the federal government are involved in defining and
enforcing IP rights. 133 IP policies include legislative limitations on IP,
executive policies toward IP-particularly involving the USPTO and
antitrust agencies-and judicial decisions on IP. Many practitioners and
scholars emphasize the importance of IP protections for inventors. 134
IP protections for commercial, scientific, and technological creations
are far from complete however. IP provides protections in four
categories: patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. 135 The
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). See also Gene Quinn, Patents,
Copyrights and the Constitution, Perfect Together, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 19, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/patents-copyrights-constitution/id=93941/.
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
133. Id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 815.04 (2018).
134. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An EconomicAnalysis of Damages Rules
in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1615 (1997) ("A substantial number
of the law and economics scholars who have written on this subject appear to agree that it is
generally preferable to protect intellectual property rights through the use of property, as opposed
to liability, rules.").
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/
135. Trade Secret Policy, USPTO,
international-protection/trade-secret-policy (last visited Nov. 24, 2018). But see WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WHAT IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? (2003) http://www.wipo.int/
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WIPO Convention's definition of IP is more inclusive because it
identifies "scientific discoveries" and "all other rights resulting from
intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic
fields."

136

In contrast to tangible property, patents and trademarks require
government grants. 13 7 The USPTO not only registers the property right,
but defines and certifies the features of the intangible asset. 138 At the
USPTO, professional patent examiners review applications for patents
and examining attorneys review applications for trademarks. 139 For
inventions to be "patentable," they must satisfy criteria such as
first-to-file, novelty, and non-obviousness. 140 For trademarks to be
"registrable," there cannot be a "likelihood of confusion" with existing
trademarks or pending applications. 14 1 The chance that a trademark is
"registrable" also depends on the category it belongs to: fanciful or
arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, or generic. 142
There are also limitations for copyright. In fiscal year 2016, the U.S.
Copyright Office issued over 414,000 registrations out of 468,000 claims
for registration. 14 3 The U.S. Copyright Office limits types of works and
applies subject matter criteria, governed by statute: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,

edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo-pub_450.pdf; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK 3 (2d ed. 2004), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/
en/intproperty/489/wipo-pub_489.pdf ("Generally speaking, intellectual property law aims at
safeguarding creators and other producers of intellectual goods and services by granting them
certain time-limited rights to control the use made of those productions. Those rights do not apply
to the physical object in which the creation may be embodied but instead to the intellectual

creation as such. Intellectual property is traditionally divided into two branches, 'industrial
property' and 'copyright."').
136. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 2, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
137. Gene Quinn, SCOTUS Says Patents Are a Government Franchise, Not a Vested
PropertyRight, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/scotussays-patents-government-franchise-not-vested-property-right/id=96324/;
see also Oil States
Energy Sers., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018).
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018).

139. See 35 U.S.C.
140. See 35 U.S.C.
141. USPTO,

§ 131 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2018).
§§ 100-03 (2018).

PROTECTING

YOUR TRADEMARK:

ENHANCING YOUR

RIGHTS THROUGH

FEDERAL REGISTRATION 3
(2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
BasicFacts.pdf.
142. Id. at 7.
143. Overview of the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/
about/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
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or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." 144
IP offers weaker protections for inventors than protections for
traditional property rights. In contrast to tangible property, patents limit
the time period of exclusive rights. The regulatory time limit is a form of
incompleteness. Richard Epstein argues that limiting the time period of
exclusive rights transforms tangible property rules to intangible property
rules. 14 5 Epstein suggests that limiting the time period for exclusion, use,
and disposition is similar to other limits placed on property generally,
including the law of private and public necessity and antitrust limitations
on collusion. 146

Subject matter limitations are another major form of incompleteness
for IP. 14 7 The subject matter limitations for patentability under the statute

specify "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter." 14 8 The Supreme Court in Bilski questioned
whether business method inventions should be patentable. 149 The
decision cast doubt on many existing business method patents and the full
range of commercial inventions, including Internet commerce software
applications. 15 0 The Supreme Court decision in Mayo raised issues about
biotechnology inventions by diagnostic tests for administering
pharmaceuticals.1 5 1 The Court rejected the invention using a two-step test
that first determined whether the invention consisted of "abstract ideas,
laws of nature, or natural phenomena," then examined whether the
invention would "transform the nature of the claim" into something

144. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
145. Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegrationof Intellectual Property?A Classical Liberal
Response to a PrematureObituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455,459 (2010) ("As I shall argue, the single
adoption of one adjustment, and one adjustment only, goes a very long way to ease the
transformation from tangible to intangible property. Just use limited terms of exclusive rights,
longer for copyrights than patents, to work the transformation from tangible property to these two
vital forms of intellectual property. At that point, the remainder of the rules that deal with tangible
property, namely those that concern exclusion, use, and disposition, can be carried over without

difficulty.").
146. Id.
147. USPTO,

PATENT

ELIGIBLE

SUBJECT

MATTER:

REPORT

ON

VIEWS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (2017),

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101-ReportFINAL.pdf.

148. 35 U.S.C.
149.
150.
J. LEGAL
151.

§ 101 (2018).

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
Id.; see also Daniel F. Spulber, Should Business Method Inventions Be Patentable?, 3
ANALYSIS 265, 267 (2011).
Mayo v. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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patentable. 152 The Supreme Court applied the two-step test in Alice to
reject a business invention for intermediated settlement. 153
IP also provides incomplete protections because patents do not cover
many incremental inventions. 154 The costs and difficulties in obtaining
and maintaining a patent can be very high.15 5 This inevitably generates
an expected value threshold for patent protections. An inventor will not
apply for a patent unless the expected value of patenting the invention
exceeds the costs of obtaining the patent. Consequently, patent
protections are incomplete because they do not cover inventions with
expected values below the threshold.
ICs help protect discoveries in the lower tail of the distribution of the
market value of inventions. IP tends to cover the upper tail of inventions
and other intangible assets. 156 Let C represent the expected legal costs
and fees of obtaining and maintaining IP such as patents. Let Y be the
market value of the IP, including own use by the IP holder, if found to be
valid by the courts. Let P be the likelihood that IP is found to be valid by
the courts and survives administrative challenges. Then, it is not
worthwhile obtaining IP if the expected benefits PY are less than the
expected costs C. This type of IP is the lower tail of the net value
distribution of intangible assets. Yet, incremental discoveries are
generated routinely and are highly important within the firm. There are
many discoveries in the lower tail of the distribution of the market value
of inventions.

157

In addition, patent application criteria and uncertainty in review by
patent examiners limit coverage for inventors. Many discoveries may be
original but not meet formal IP criteria, including those based on laws of

152. USPTO, supra note 147, at 8.
153. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
154. Gene Quinn, ProtectingIdeas: Can Ideas Be Protected or Patented?, IP WATCHDOG
(Feb.
15,
2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/15/protecting-ideas-can-ideas-beprotected-or-patented/id=48009/.

155. Quinn, supra note 29 ("Thanks to the United States Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and ever more regulations from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office it has become more difficult over the years to create the type of written

description and claim sets required.").
156. Jill Green & Melody Wirz, Whose Idea Is it Anyway? 10 IP Issues in Deals, ACC
DOCKET, Dec. 2010, at 40.
157. See Bronwyn H. Hall and Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.,
101 (2001); Lee Fleming, Breakthroughs and the "Long Tail" of Innovation, 49 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 69 (2007); C6dric Schneider, External Knowledge Sourcing: Science, Market and
the Value of PatentedInventions, 30 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION EcON. 551 (2009); and Ga6tan
De Rassenfosse, Do Firms face a Trade-Off between the Quantity and the Quality of their
Inventions?, 42 RESEARCH POLICY 1072 (2013).
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nature, non-obviousness, and usefulness.15 8 These considerations
eliminate property protections for inventions that do not pass through
formal review and meet the regulatory criteria. The risks of the review
process further increase the expected value threshold for patent
protections. 159 Fewer inventors seeking patent protections which further
increases the incompleteness of IP.
IP protections also are incomplete because of costs and inaccuracies
in the legal and regulatory systems. Patent holders face costs of detecting
and monitoring infringement. 16 0 The legal costs of obtaining
compensation for infringement are significant. Additionally, patents are
subject to costly legal challenges in terms of validity and infringement.
Unavoidable legal errors, inconsistencies, and technical issues further
limit IP protections for some useful and original inventions. Patents are
also subject to challenge at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
within the USPTO, which may also be subject to error. 161 Taken together,
these costs and risks create another type of value threshold for patent
protections. Patents with an expected value below this threshold will not
have IP protections.
Stronger protections for trade secrets address some of these
limitations. More companies rely on protections from trade secrets and
trademarks than from copyrights and patents. 162 Trade secrets do not
require formal government grants of IP. 163 Ivan Png points out that "trade
158. Gene Quinn, Patentability: The Nonobviousness Requirement of 35 U.S.C. 103, IP
WATCHDOG
(June
17,
2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/17/patentabilitynonobviousness-35-usc-103/id=847 16/.
159. Neal Solomon, The Problem of Patent Valuation, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 15, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/15/problem-patent-valuation/id=86840/.
160. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of PatentedInventions, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 53, 54-55 (2011).
161. Gene Quinn, PTAB Judges Shockingly Inexperienced Compared to District Court
Judges, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/06/ptab-judgesshockingly-inexperienced/id=94438/ ("The America Invents Act (AIA) invests PTAB judges
with extraordinary powers. For example, overwhelmingly institution decisions are not appealable.
Yet, there have been numerous lawyers with shockingly little experience appointed to the position
of patent judge, and vested with the power to make decisions that cannot be reviewed by any

Article III federal court.").
162. See JOHN E. JANKOWSKI,

NAT'L Sci. FOUND.,

BUSINESS

USE OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY PROTECTION DOCUMENTED IN NSF SURVEY 1 (2012), http://wayback.archive-it.org/
5902/20181004073804/https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsfl2307/nsfl2307.pdf
("New
survey findings from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the U.S. Census Bureau
(Census) indicate that trademarks and trade secrets are identified by the largest number of
businesses as important forms of IP protection, followed by copyrights, and then patents."); see
generally JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS (2017).
163. Shane E. Olafson, Patents vs. Trade Secrets-Giving Your Business the Competitive
Edge, ARIz. BIOINSIDER (Apr. 1, 2007), https://www.Irrc.com/files/Uploads/Documents/
Olafson_AZBiolnsider.pdf.
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secrets can be unlimited in time, are not limited by particular technical
standards, and do not require disclosure. Moreover, the scope of trade
secrecy is much broader, extending to work in progress as well as
completed innovations." 164 Individual states' adoption of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) has increased protections for inventors and
innovators. 165 Png finds that state adoption of the UTSA has tended to
increase R&D. 166

Although trade secrets cover works in progress, they are not sufficient
to protect the continual sharing of information within and among firms.
Many lower tail discoveries must be disclosed to employees and the
firm's customers, suppliers, and partners. 167 ICS overcome some of the
limitations of trade secret protections. IC protections, such as nondisclosure agreements (NDAs), address the need to share various trade
secrets in employment and outsourcing. 168
ICs help protect cooperative use of knowledge and intangible assets
not covered by formal IP. Technological change involves repeated
interactions over time between a firm and its employees and among firms.
This interaction involves continual sharing of small increments of
knowledge. The formal apparatus of IP cannot protect such small
increments of knowledge because IP is geared to larger increases in
knowledge. This is because the sharing of small increments of knowledge
is often informal and incomplete. Also, the costs of obtaining government
grants of IP are necessarily prohibitive for small increments of
knowledge. Continual sharing of knowledge may involve relational
contracts because of the need for trust and implicit agreements that cannot
be achieved with IP.
B. ICs and Excludability of IP
Parties can form ICs to allocate ownership of intangible assets and to
specify how those assets will be used. These private agreements depend
on contract rules and private negotiation. ICs resolve problems related to
the excludability of intangible assets. The parties to an IC can choose the

164. I.P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from State Trade Secrets Laws, 99 REV.
EcoN. & STAT. 167, 168 (2017).
165. Id. at 175.

166. Id.
167. Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role of
PreinventionAssignment Agreements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163, 163
(1994).
168. Epstein, supra note 145, at 458 ("Any agreement, for example, whereby a trade secret
is shared pursuant to a confidentiality agreement involves the simultaneous transmission and
retention of information-but only if the contractual arrangements are given strong protection, as

they typically are.").
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desired extent of exclusion. The effectiveness of IP should be considered
in combination with ICs.
Legal barriers limiting access to IP substitute for the lack of physical
barriers. It is more difficult for IP owners to limit, deter, and monitor
access to intangible assets in contrast to tangible assets. 169 Peter Menell
notes that "even if someone claims to own the knowledge, it is difficult
to exclude others from using it. Intellectual property law is an attempt to
solve that problem by legal means." 170 R&D can generate positive
externalities because knowledge can be costless for others to learn and
distribute while it can be costly for IP holders to monitor usage by others.
Positive externalities from R&D often are referred to as R&D
"spillovers." 1 7 1
The debate over patent scope considers the effects of legal exclusion
on sequential invention and innovation. Robert Merges and Richard
Nelson argue that patent scope should be narrow so as to encourage
rivalry among inventors. 172 They express concerns that narrow patents
will favor pioneer inventors and block competing inventors. 173 Advocates
of narrow patent scope argue that exclusion creates monopoly rents for
patent holders. 174 The advantages of not protecting patent holders'
investments in developing an invention are inducing investment in
developing and applying the invention by later inventors. 175
Others argue that patent scope should be sufficiently broad to help
inventors develop their own inventions without incursion by later
inventors. 176 Broader patent protections encompassing future
development encourage inventors to invest in improving and

169. Owners of buildings and land can place fences around their properties. Owners of
automobiles and other vehicles can equip them with locks and other antitheft devices. Companies
have various mechanisms for deterring theft of their goods, equipment, and financial assets.
170. Menell, supra note 31, at 726.
171. Pere Arqu6-Castells & Daniel F. Spulber, Measuring the Private and Social Returns to
R&D: Unintended Spillovers Versus Technology Markets (Nw. L. & Econ. Research, Paper No.
18-18, 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3202870.
172. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or
Encouraging Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. EcON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 6 (1994).
173. See sources cited supra note 172.
174. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. EcON. PERSP. 3,
18 (2013).
175. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the PatentLaw, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991).
176. On arguments for broader patent scope, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents
Provide the Foundationof the Marketfor Inventions, 11 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 271 (2015).
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commercializing their patented inventions. 177 Broader patent protections
also support investment in creating the initial invention and encourage
disclosure of inventions. 178 Also, broader patent protections allow patent
holders to choose the mix of own use and outsourcing efficiently based
on the relative economic returns to these activities.
With positive externalities from R&D, the social benefits of the initial
invention are greater than the private benefits to the initial inventor. With
broader patent scope, there is greater protection for IP rights of inventors
and correspondingly fewer R&D spillovers. Conversely, with narrower
patent scope, there is less protection for IP rights of inventors and
correspondingly more R&D spillovers.
The problem of patent scope is thus similar to the problem of social
cost. The social costs of an activity are defined as the total of private
costs. 179 The social costs of an activity exceed the private costs to the

owner of an activity when the activity imposes costs on others. 18 0 The
costs or harm imposed on others are referred to as a negative externality
if the costs are not part of a market transaction between the parties. Coase
showed that private negotiation achieves efficiency regarding the extent
of negative externalities when transaction costs are low and few parties
are involved.1 8 1 Coase emphasized that the assignment of property rights
does not affect the efficiency of the outcome because the negotiating
parties maximize their joint benefits. 182 If the party creating harm has
property rights, the party suffering harm will pay them to stop. 183 If the
party suffering harm has property rights, the party creating harm will be
forced to pay compensation. 184 The extent of the activity will be such that
the marginal private benefit to the party causing harm will equal the
marginal damage to the party suffering harm. 18 5 The only effect of the
initial assignment of property rights is distributional because the party
with property rights will benefit at the expense of the party without
property rights. 186

When transaction costs are low and few parties are involved, the
parties are able to attain an efficient outcome regardless of the assignment
of property rights. 187 However, when transaction costs are high and many
177. Kieff, supranote 92, at 710.
178. Kitch, supra note 176, at 278.
179. ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 189 (4th ed. 1932).

180. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
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parties are involved, the assignment of property rights can affect the
outcome.1 88 This is because frictions may prevent or distort bargaining,
thus preventing the parties from attaining an efficient outcome. It is then
more efficient to assign property rights so as to minimize transaction
costs. For example, there may be a few firms engaged in the activity that
causes harm and many individuals suffering harm from the external
effects of the activity. It is then more efficient to assign property rights to
those suffering harm.
ICs can address the problem of patent scope and the effects of positive
externalities from R&D. When transaction costs are low and few parties
are involved, contract negotiation should attain the efficient outcome
regardless of patent scope. If patent scope is narrow, the party benefitting
from the initial invention can pay the inventor to conduct R&D. If patent
scope is broad, the party benefitting from the initial invention can pay the
inventor to use the invention, thus providing additional incentives for the
inventor. The parties will reach an efficient agreement regardless of the
initial assignment of IP rights.
ICs may not fully remedy the problem of patent scope when
transaction costs are high and many parties are involved. In this situation,
the choice of patent scope does affect economic efficiency. It is necessary
for patent policy to assign property rights that achieve the right mix of
initial and sequential invention. This suggests the need for broader patent
scope because licensing the invention to later inventors should involve
lower transaction costs than providing subsidies to potential initial
inventors. As Merges points out, many potential buyers and high
transaction costs suggest the need for stronger IP to support contracts. 189
The length of patent life affects the initial inventor's returns from
transferring or licensing the patent to the second inventor. 190 Also, the
scope of the patent affects the extent to which sequential invention
requires the second inventor to acquire or license the intangible assets of
188. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. EcON. 1, 13

(1969) ("If the cost of contracting is positive, the kind of property rights system that is established
may change the allocation of resources in the production of knowledge.").
189. Robert P. Merges, Of PropertyRules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.

REV. 2655, 2662 (1994) ("Even though there are many dispersed buyers (and sellers) of IPRs, and
even though the transaction costs of IPR exchanges are otherwise high, the strong property rule
baseline often works quite well. The frequency of contracting in many markets for IPRs-an
underdeveloped theme in most of the entitlements literature-gives rise to a myriad of institutions
(broadly defined) designed to streamline the exchange of property rights.").
190. See Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 21 (1995); Ted O'Donoghue et al., Patent Breadth, Patent
Life, and the Pace of TechnologicalProgress, 7 J. EcON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 2 (1998); John
H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential
Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 450 (1997).
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the first inventor. 19 1 ICs allow the allocation of returns among sequential
inventors. Nancy Gallini argues that shorter lived, broad patents promote
diffusion of inventions but longer lived, narrow patents lower R&D
costs. 192 Amy Landers recommends that in patent disputes, courts should

consider sequential invention and defines apportionment as "an
examination of the differences between the infringed claim and the prior
art in a manner analogous to the identification of the differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art in the non-obviousness
analysis." 19 3
ICs also provide an important mechanism for addressing positive
externalities in R&D. 194 Firms can internalize these benefits through
licensing or cross-licensing agreements. Firms also can internalize
positive externalities by creating RJVs and R&D consortia. Companies
forming RJVs may employ covenants not to compete (CNCs) to
coordinate their R&D activities. This type of CNC is a form of IC. CNCs
date back over three centuries. 195 Sarath Sanga points out that corporate
joint ventures involve an inherent fiduciary conflict between each
company's duty to its own interests and its duty to the interests of a
partner. 196 Sanga argues that this conflict of interests is resolved not only
by operating the joint venture as a separate entity, but though the use of
a CNC. 197

ICs address problems arising from insufficient exclusivity of IP. Firms
must disclose IP within their organizations. Firms licensing IP must
disclose the features of the invention. Kenneth Arrow observed that
offering inventions for sale or license involves revealing the secret. 19 8
Inventors must disclose their technology in order to obtain a patent.
Trademarks and copyrighted works only have value if used openly.

191. See O'Donoghue et al., supra note 190, at 2; Barton, supra note 190, at 449.
192. Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J.EcON. 52, 53 (1992).
193. Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury and Sequential
Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 471, 476 (2012).
194. For some discussion of spillovers and RJVs, see Claude D'Aspremont & Alexis
Jacquemin, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers, 78 AM. ECON.
REv. 1133 (1988); Kotaro Suzumura, Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly
with Spillovers, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 1307 (1992).
195. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629
(1960).
196. Sarath Sanga, A Theory of Corporate Joint Ventures, 106 CAL. L. REv. 1437, 1438
(2018).
197. Id. at 1454.
198. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, 087014-304-2 NAT'L BUREAU OF EcON. REs. 609, 615 (1962), https://www.nber.org/chapters/
c2144.pdf.
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ICs also help control technology transactions that occur when
employees who switch jobs convey knowledge and inventions from their
previous employer to their new one. Ronald Gilson includes legal
frameworks as a source of agglomeration economies driving places like
California's Silicon Valley. 199 Gilson emphasizes the importance of
CNCs that facilitate employee job switching while protecting a
company's intangible assets. 2 0 0 These types of CNCs also function as ICs.
Legal barriers provide weaker protections for intangible assets than
for tangible assets. ICs remedy weaknesses in legal protections for IP.
Infringement of a patent occurs when someone "without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the
term of the patent . . . "201 An IC specifies who will make, use, offer to
sell, or sell an invention, and places additional limitations on use and the
amount of compensation. Enforcement of the agreement provides
protections of the contracting parties' expectations.
C. ICs and Non-Rivalrous Usage of IP
Non-rivalrous usage of intangible assets distinguishes ICs from
standard contracts involving tangible assets. ICs handle the non-rivalrous
usage of intangible assets by facilitating allocation and sharing among
multiple adopters. ICs support cooperation in developing and combining
intangible assets. For example, a patent holder can grant access to an
invention to multiple users by offering multiple patent license contracts.
ICs help define the characteristics and boundaries of intangible assets.
Agreements between inventors, innovators, and adopters specify the
features of technology being shared or transferred. Contracts adjust to the
benefits and costs of the parties to the agreement and the needs of the
industries in which they do business.
Some argue that IP should not receive the same legal protections as
tangible property because of extensive interdependence associated with
information. For example, Menell asserts: "Intellectual property has
never fit the real property mold particularly well and the inherent
attributes of intellectual resources as well as the increasingly
interdependent nature of information ecosystems points away from the
[property rights movement's] PRM's conception of property." 202

199. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology IndustrialDistricts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577 (1999).

200. Id.
201. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
202. Menell, supra note 31, at 753.
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Yet, as Polk Wagner observes, even open source advocates seek
control: "[D]espite rhetoric to the contrary, it seems quite clear that the
'open' in open source is actually rather tightly controlled, albeit in the
name of generally greater access along certain philosophically-favored
dimensions." 203 Polk points out that even open source advocates turn to
contracts for coordination:
It should come as no surprise that participants in open
source development efforts recognize the need for
external coordination, chiefly attempting to accomplish
this through the licensing of intellectual property rights to
the software. Such licenses are not trivial; perhaps the best
known open source license, the GNU General Public
License (GPL), has been noted as an aggressive approach
to both contract and copyright law, purporting to bind all
subsequent users of the software to the terms of the
original license. 204

Transactions among inventors, innovators, and technology adopters
depend on effective IC rules. ICs that protect the expectation interests of
investors generate the benefits of interdependence in markets for
invention. IP provides the foundation for the market for inventions. 205 ICs
realize the benefits of coordination among creators and IP users. ICs
provide parties with mechanisms to benefit from non-rivalrous usage of
intangible assets.
D. ICs and Incentives for Exploratory Performance
An IC must solve the critical problem of designing incentives for what
I refer to as exploratory performance. With technological change, the
characteristics of the outcomes of invention, innovation, and technology
adoption are likely to be unknown. The uncertainty involved is more
complex than a lottery over known outcomes.
Uncertainty about the characteristics of outcomes increases
transaction costs of contracting. 206 This distinguishes ICs from standard
contracts involving tangible assets. Difficulties in specifying

203. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 1031 (2003).
204. Id. at 1030.
205. Spulber, supranote 77, at 271.
206. On transaction costs of contract formation, see Coase, supranote 112, and Coase, supra
note 181, at 15-16.
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performance also will affect the incentives of parties involved in contract
negotiation.207

An IC must specify the bargain when the characteristics of outcomes
are unknown. With unknown outcomes, it becomes difficult to specify
what performance is being offered and what performance is being
accepted. The problems of defining and verifying performance make it
difficult to determine the intent of the parties.
Almost all invention, innovation, and technology adoption involves
delegation, whether it be to specialized personnel, managers, or firms. 20 8
So, an IC is likely to be subject to the two main forms of agency costs
resulting from moral hazard and adverse selection. 209 A moral hazard
problem arises when the employee's actions are imperfectly observable
or verifiable. 2 10 Then, the IC must be based on some measure of
performance generated by the employee's actions. Because there is a
tradeoff between the cost of inducing action and the benefits of the action,
the agent's action will differ from what would be chosen with observable
actions. 2 11 The agent may not choose an efficient level of effort or
investment.212 Here, an efficient level of effort or investment refers to
actions that maximize the joint benefits of the contracting parties. If the
agent's activity is subject to additional uncertainty, it is not possible to
infer the agent's effort from the resulting output. Contracts must therefore
provide incentives to the agent or partner to generate effort or investment.
Contractual incentives are based on the measure of performance and
reward hidden actions indirectly.
An IC is also likely to be subject to adverse selection. An adverse
selection problem arises if the employee has hidden information. 2 13 Even
if the agent's action is observable and legally verifiable, the other party
will not know what would have been the most efficient action. To address
this problem, it is necessary to reward the agent's performance. There is
207. The costs and rules of contract formation affect the incentives of parties involved in
contract negotiation, see Coase, supranote 181; Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and
Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of ContractFormation,89 MICH. L. REV. 215,230 (1990).
208. Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39, at 39 ("Firms must design and apply incentive
contracts for specialized economic agents who conduct R&D because most R&D is a delegated
activity. The skills, knowledge and personnel necessary for the invention often differ from those
needed for other production and operating activities and generally require independent business
units. Companies and government agencies conduct R&D in-house by employing specialized

experts such as scientists, engineers, and statisticians.").
209. Masako N. Darrough & Neal M. Stoughton, Moral Hazardand Adverse Selection: The
Question ofFinancialStructure, 41 J. FIN. 501, 501 (1986).
210. Id.
211. Gustavo Manso, Motivating Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 1823, 1830 (2011).
212. Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39, at n.6.
213. Darrough & Stoughton, supranote 209, at 501.
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a tradeoff between the cost of inducing the agent to tell the truth and
benefits of obtaining an accurate report. 214 To induce truth telling, it may
be necessary to allow a distortion of the agent's effort away from the
efficient level of effort. 2 15
Contracting costs associated with exploratory performance may differ
from the agency costs associated with moral hazard and adverse
selection. An IC can address the problem of determining exploratory
performance when there is a general measure of benefits for one of the
parties. 2 16 For example, a firm can base the rewards for specialized R&D
personnel on the overall performance of the firm. This can be achieved
by providing stock options for both managers and specialized R&D
personnel. 217 Software companies provide long-term incentive contracts,
such as stock options, to engineers and programmers involved in
invention and innovation. 218 Firms making substantial investments in
R&D may engage in greater delegation of authority and provide more
stock options as incentives for non-executive employees. 219 Companies
are also significantly increasing the use of long-term incentive contracts
for managers of R&D units. 22 0
The problem of rewarding exploratory performance is related to the
issue of rewarding agents when the contract cannot be based on the
principal's objective. Difficulties in measuring performance limit

214. See Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory, 98
AM. EcoN. REv. 586, 587 (2008) ("[I]ncentive constraints express the basic fact that individuals

will not share private information or exert hidden efforts without appropriate incentives.").
215.

See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAs DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 95-96 (2005);

JEAN-JACQUEs LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVEs 29 (2002); Michael

C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
216. Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39, at 54.
217. Id. at 38.
218. Fredrik Andersson et al., Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative
Industries?, 119 EcON. J. F308, F327 (2009) ("We show that software firms that operate in
software sectors with highly skewed returns to innovation, or high upside gains to innovation, are
more likely to attract and pay for highly talented workers. Such firms do so first by paying more
up-front in starting salaries to attract skilled employees and second by rewarding workers
handsomely for experience or loyalty.").
219. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plansfor Non-Executive Employees, 61
J. FIN. EcoN. 253, 272 (2001) ("Firms with greater monitoring costs and greater growth options
(proxied by firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and R&D expense) provide greater option
incentives to non-executive employees.").
220. Josh Lerner & Julie Wulf, Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from CorporateR&D,

89 REV. EcON. STAT. 634, 634 (2007) ("Among firms with a centralized R&D organization, a
clear relationship emerges: more long-term incentives granted to corporate R&D heads are
associated with more heavily cited patents. These incentives also appear to be associated with

more frequent awards and patents of greater originality.").
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reliance on monitoring employees. 221 However, "high-powered"
incentives directly tied to individual performance are often problematic.
For example, rewarding R&D personnel based on the number of patents
may generate lower quality patents than rewards based on overall
performance of the firm. 222 Even if the profit or stock price of the firm is
observable, it can be difficult to anticipate the relationship between the
benefits to the firm and the outcome of invention, innovation, or
technology adoption.
Measuring performance may be problematic when basic inventions
must undergo extensive development. This can generate delays in
realizing the benefits of scientific and technological discoveries. Basic
inventions
often do not generate market returns without
commercialization. 22 3 Obtaining rewards from inventions generally
requires application in innovative products, production processes, and
transaction methods. 224
Another important aspect of ICs is that specialized research personnel
engaged in exploratory performance may respond well to intrinsic
motivation. 225 When R&D employees respond to intrinsic motivation,
they may have an increased willingness to take risks. 226 Risk taking may
be desirable in R&D because employees may pursue projects involving
greater creativity and may devote more effort to experimentation. 227
Companies can design contracts and rewards that emphasize intrinsic
motivation.
Kevin Murdock argues that the pharmaceutical company Merck's
Mectizan Donation Program illustrates contracting with intrinsic
motivation. 228 Merck developed the drug Mectizan as a cure for river
blindness and offered the drug to potential users for free. 229 The Mectizan
Donation Program states that it is "the longest-running drug donation
program for Neglected Tropical Diseases," with over 300 million
221. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 777, 780 (1972).
222. See George P. Baker, Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement, 100 J. POL.
EcoN. 598, 609 (1992).
223. David
M.
Anderson,
Commercialization,
HALF
COST
PRODUCTS,
http://www.halfcostproducts.com/commercialization.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).
224. Id.
225. Todd Dewett, Linking IntrinsicMotivation, Risk Taking, and Employee Creativity in an
R&D Environment, 37 R&D MGMT. 197, 197 (2007).
226. See id.; see also Markus Baer et al., Rewarding Creativity: When Does it Really
Matter?, 14 LEADERSHIP Q. 569, 571 (2003).
227. Dewett, supra note 225, at 204.
228. Kevin Murdock, Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts, 33 RAND J.
EcoN. 650, 653 (2002).
229. Id.
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treatments per year for river blindness (onchocerciasis) and lymphatic
filariasis elimination. 230 According to Murdock, a firm and its research
personnel derive gains from trade when employees have intrinsic
motivation. 231 Although the Mectizan project had negative financial
returns for Merck, the firm benefitted because its research employees
worked harder on other projects.2 32 With intrinsic motivation, a firm
realizes benefits from joint enforcement of multiple implicit contracts. 233
Richard Gruner argues that patents encourage inventors to "dream
big" and complete their projects. 2 3 4 He identifies some psychological
aspects of invention and innovation that can generate errors:
At least four psychological factors make it difficult for
inventors to produce successful inventions based on
distinctively new designs. These include: 1) difficulties in
projecting the capabilities of new technologies in ways
that point to new and distinctively different product
designs; 2) divergences in the knowledge and experience
of product inventors and product users, causing inventors
to imperfectly understanding the functional needs and
problems of potential invention users; 3) gaps in
knowledge and experience of product inventors
concerning the contexts where new inventions will be
produced, supplied, and used, and; 4) inabilities of
inventors to fully imagine the impacts of new inventions
in use and the relative happiness of users with new
inventions compared with alternative means for producing
similar practical results. 235
Gruner suggests changes in patent laws that would provide incentives for
inventors that overcome these psychological problems. 236 However, it is
unlikely that patent law can be fine-tuned to address problems of inventor
imagination.
In contrast, private ordering through contract terms can avoid the
problems of a one-size-fits-all system of government grants. Patent

230. Overview, MECTIZAN DONATION PROGRAM, https://mectizan.org/what/overview/ (last
visited Nov. 11, 2018).
231. Murdock, supra note 228, at 651.

232. Id. at 667 ("When workers are intrinsically motivated, there are 'gains from trade' that
arise when the firm implements a project that has negative financial return but generates large
intrinsic returns to the agent.").

233. Id.
234. Richard S. Gruner, Imagination, Invention, and Patent Incentives: The Psychology of
Patent Law, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375, 435 (2017).

235. Id. at 380.
236. Id. at 382.
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examination rules are legal standards applied by patent examiners. 237 In
contrast to these legal rules, firms can be flexible and adaptable. Firms
can adjust contract terms depending on the industry, the product, the type
of technology, and even the capabilities of individual researchers. Firms
can also vary contract terms over time in response to changes in
competition, scientific discoveries, regulation, and consumer demand.
Through the use of ICs, firms are able to design contracts that improve
incentives for exploratory performance for employees, managers, and
subcontractors. Firms can induce exploratory performance by offering
basic rewards contingent on the overall financial performance of the firm.
Firms can coordinate invention, commercialization, and innovation to
provide rewards for exploratory performance. Firms can offer a
combination of extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation to help induce
creative performance. Firms can design ICs that help inventors overcome
psychological barriers to creativity.
E. ICs and Fundamental Uncertainty
Technological change involves fundamental uncertainty that may not
be present in most standard contracts. 23 8 ICs provide basic mechanisms
such as royalties and options that address fundamental uncertainty. 239
Even when parties to a contract face risk with a known likelihood of
events, it is difficult and costly to form contingent contracts. 240 With

fundamental uncertainty, contingent contracting becomes more
difficult-to the point that any IC will likely be incomplete. Contract law
tends to limit contractual constraints on renegotiation and therefore
favors simpler contract forms. 241
Parties forming ICs encounter various forms of fundamental
uncertainty that I refer to as statistical, discovery, creativity, and market
uncertainty. Statistical uncertainty describes researchers' uncertainty
about the outcome of their experiments. Researchers typically design
experiments and gather the data generated by those experiments.
Researchers usually do not know the characteristics of the population

237. See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., The USPTO Patent ExaminationResearch Dataset:A
Window on Patent Processing,27 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 554, 557 (2018).
238.

See generally DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE

PURSUIT OF ECONoMIC GROWTH (1989). I do not consider various types of legal uncertainty that
may affect ICs. These include uncertainty about approval of a patent application and whether a
patent will be found to be valid and infringed in court proceedings.
239. See Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39, at 54.
240. See Ronald A. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT'L ECON. REV. 233, 233-34
(1985).
241. Schwartz & Watson, supra note 38, at 26; see Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39
(discussing of renegotiation possibility effects on the form of incentive contracts).
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from which the data was drawn, which is typically expressed as the lack
of knowledge about the form of the probability distribution regarding
some features of the population.2 4 2 Researchers may not know anything
about the form of the distribution, or researchers may know something
about the form of the distribution but not specific parameter values of the
distribution. This lack of knowledge can affect researchers' decisions in
many different ways. 243
Researchers use statistical inference to characterize the probability
distribution that generates the data. 24 4 Given samples drawn from an
unknown population distribution, researchers make inferences about
what is the form of the distribution. 24 5 Statistical inference may take the
form of estimation, construction of intervals that reflect a particular level
of confidence, and hypothesis testing. 24 6
Even if researchers learn something about the population distribution,
they still may not know the distribution with certainty. 24 7 Thus, the
process of experimentation and statistical inference does not fully
eliminate uncertainty. The uncertainty can be described using probability,
but even these probabilities may not be known with accuracy. 24 8
Discovery uncertainty refers to lack of knowledge about the future
discoveries of other researchers. This reflects not only uncertainty about
the outcome of particular experiments but also uncertainty regarding the
types of experiments undertaken by other researchers and professional
interactions among researchers. Researchers benefit from the past
discoveries of others. As Isaac Newton wrote, "If I have seen further, it

242.

See LARRY WASSERMAN, ALL OF STATISTICS: A CONCISE COURSE IN STATISTICAL

&

INFERENCE 87 (2013), http://static.stevereads.com/papers-toread/all_oftstatistics.pdf.
243. See Martin Weber & Colin Camerer, Recent Developments in Modelling Preferences
Under Risk, 9 OPERATIONS-RESEARCH-SPEKTRUM 129 (1987); see generally Colin Camerer
Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J.
OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325 (1992) (providing examples of useful surveys).
244. See WASSERMAN, supra note 242, at 5.
245. Id. at 90.
246. Id.
247. See David Dequech, Fundamental Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 26 E. EcON. J. 41, 50-

51 (2000) ("Going beyond situations of ambiguity, members of different schools of heterodox
economic thought have emphasized situations of uncertainty of a more radical type. These
situations are essentially characterized by the possibility of creativity and structural change and
therefore by significant indeterminacy of the future. Uncertainty appears here in a dynamic
context, in which the passage of time is crucial. The future cannot be anticipated by a fully reliable
probabilistic estimate because the future is yet to be created.").
248. Id.; see generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (1921),
https://archive.org/stream/treatiseonprobab007528mbp#page/nl05/mode/2up/search/uncertainty.
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is by standing on the shoulders of giants."249 However, new discoveries
will support or refute past discoveries. This effect compounds the
statistical uncertainty researchers face when carrying out a particular
project because the outcome of many other projects will impact the value
of their work.
Science proceeds through discoveries that may confirm, extend, or
refute previous discoveries. Thomas Kuhn argues that the development
of scientific knowledge depends on a series of contentious revolutions. 250
Each area of scientific inquiry goes through phases associated with
dominant conceptual paradigms during which "normal-scientific
research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories
that the paradigm already supplies." 25 1 As Kuhn observes:
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly,
i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated
the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal
science. It then continues with a more or less extended
exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only
when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the
anomalous has become the expected.2 52
Israel Scheffler questions the revolution metaphor, emphasizing
instead the scientific evaluation of evidence: "The quality of scientific
deliberations makes for a special and rare form of argumentation. It
demands responsibility to the evidence, openness to argument,
commitment to publication, loyalty to logic, and an admission, in
principle, that one may turn out to be wrong."253
Whether through contentious revolutions or reasoned debate, new
scientific discoveries cause researchers to reevaluate past discoveries. It
is not feasible for ICs to address such complex contingencies. ICs for
delegated or cooperative research are necessarily incomplete. IC design
and legal rules thus need to provide general incentives for performance
under discovery uncertainty.

249. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (on file with the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania Digital Library), https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/
9792.
250. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 2 (2d enlarged ed.,
1970).
251. Id. at 24.
252. Id. at 52-53.
253. Israel Scheffler, Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on Kuhn, 39 PHIL. Sci. 366, 374
(1972).
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Creativity uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge about what
other inventors and innovators will develop. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict the outcomes of invention and innovation. 254 The
limitless variety of creativity that is evident in the arts, such as music or
literature, extends to invention and innovation in commerce, science, and
technology. The creations of inventors and innovators inspire future
creativity, further complicating uncertainty.
The creativity of inventors and innovators affects the economic value
of past inventions and innovations. Inventions and innovations generate
technological change that can enhance or diminish the past contributions
of inventors, innovators, and adopters. Just as with discovery uncertainty,
it is difficult, if not impossible, for an IC to address contingencies based
on the creativity of other inventors and innovators. IC rules must
therefore address the complexities of inventor and innovator creativity.
The creativity of other economic actors affects the expectation
interests of parties to an IC in unpredictable ways. Advances in
technology can serve as complements for existing technology and
improve the performance of existing inventions and innovations. For
example, advances in software can improve the demand for computer
hardware. 255 Conversely, advances in technology can be substitutes for
existing technology, leading to its obsolescence. For example, smart
phones have displaced basic mobile phones. This corresponds to Joseph
Schumpeter's concept of "creative destruction."256
The novel and non-obvious criteria for the patentability of an
invention
illustrate
creativity
uncertainty. 257
Novelty
and
non-obviousness are fleeting. An invention is a new and useful
production process, machine, manufacturing technique, or composition
of matter. 258 Patents are granted for novel inventions, but novelty is not a
guarantee of market value because new technologies can readily
supersede a patent long before it expires.259 Obviousness is also subject
to fundamental uncertainty. Based on experiments, Gregory Mandel
observes:
254. David Dequech, Expectations and Confidence Under Uncertainty, 21 J. POST
KEYNESIAN EcON. 415, 416 (1999).
255.

EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE & HANDELSBLATT RESEARCH INST.,

FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE INVENTIONs

PATENTS AND THE

BEHIND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

20

(2017), https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/17FDB5538E87B4B9C12581
EF0045762F/$File/fourth industrial-revolution_2017_en.pdf.
256. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (Routledge 2006)
(1942).

257. 25 U.S.C.
258. 35 U.S.C.

§§ 102-03 (2018).
§ 101 (2018).

259. Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 131, 146 (1990).
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The results are dramatic: the hindsight bias prejudices
patent decisions far more than anticipated. Not only are
patent decisions routinely and unintentionally made in
contradiction to patent doctrine, but even more
significantly, patent law itself is incoherent. Judges,
jurors, and patent examiners seemingly lack the cognitive
ability to make decisions in the manner that patent law
currently requires. 260
Private agreements fill in many of the gaps left by public awards of IP
and judicial decisions on patent validity. IC rules and the design of
agreements can address the creativity effects of technological change. ICs
reflect the parties' expectations and respond to their perceptions of what
is new or obvious. The parties to an IC are better placed to evaluate how
the creativity of others will affect their economic benefits. ICs handle
much of what happens after the grant of IP.
Market uncertainty refers to unknown demand and costs, which can
be heightened by the effects of technological change. We do not know
what the demand for inventions will be in advance, particularly when the
inventions have not been fully developed or tested. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict the demand for innovations because they are new
to the market. Some innovations, such as smart phones, diffuse rapidly
and change the economy, and yet other innovations may be unsuccessful.
It is also difficult for companies to estimate how adopting innovations
will affect their costs and revenues. Additionally, companies face
difficulties predicting competitor innovations and the effects that those
innovations will have on market outcomes.
Market uncertainty represents fundamental uncertainty. It is difficult
to determine market demand and supply because knowledge about
demand and costs is dispersed among individual consumers and firms.
Friedrich Hayek observes that society's economic problem is "the
utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality." 2 6 1 Hayek
emphasizes that "the sort of knowledge with which I have been concerned
is knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics
and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical
form."2 6 2 For Hayek, prices help to coordinate transactions by making the
best use of dispersed knowledge. 263 The price system is essential as an
260. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
HindsightBias Renders PatentDecisions Irrational,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2006).
261. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 (1945).
262. Id. at 524.
263. Id. at 526.
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adjustment mechanism: "It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic
problems arise always and only in consequence of change."264
Hayek argues that market uncertainty presents even greater
difficulties than scientific uncertainty. 26 5 This is because market
outcomes are fleeting and lack the relatively greater stability of scientific
discoveries:
The difference between economic competition and the
successful procedure of science is that the former exhibits
a method of discovering particular temporary
circumstances, while science seeks to discover something
often known as "general facts," i.e., regularities in events,
and is concerned with unique, particular facts only to the
extent that they tend to refute or confirm its theories. 266
Because of market uncertainty, Hayek observes that "competition is
important primarily as a discovery procedure whereby entrepreneurs
constantly search for unexploited opportunities that can also be taken
advantage of by others." 2 6 7
The need to coordinate transactions becomes even more important
when dealing with invention, innovation, and adoption. Market
uncertainty has greater effects with technological change because
inventions and innovations are untested. This makes ICs the essential
means of addressing dispersed knowledge and adjusting to technological
change.
III. INTELLECTUAL CONTRACT TYPES

ICs protect the expectation interests of parties involved in
technological change, including inventors, innovators, and adopters. This
section considers various types of IC, including employment contracts,
outsourcing contracts, licensing contracts, research joint ventures, and
intermediary and collective rights organizations.
A. Employment Contracts
Companies hire specialized personnel to carry out invention,
innovation, and adoption. Employment contracts between firms and
specialized personnel are an important form of IC. Firms use ICs with

264. Id. at 523.
265. Id. at 523-24.
266. F. A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, 5
(Marcellus S. Snow trans., 2002) (1968).
267. Id. at 18.

Q. J.

AUSTRIAN ECON. 9, 11
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managers and employees to create new products, production processes,
transaction methods, and organizations. 26 8
Most R&D is a delegated activity. R&D refers to basic research,
applied research, and experimental development. 269 R&D is the process
of discovery and knowledge creation. Designing employment contracts
for delegated R&D can be challenging because R&D generates both
explicit and tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge can be difficult and costly
to observe, transfer, and reproduce. 270
Annual expenditures on R&D in the US exceed one-half trillion
dollars. 27 1 Industry provides the main source of this funding ($347.7
billion); the other sources are the federal, state, and local governments
($140.2 billion), academia ($19.3 billion), and non-profits ($20.3
billion).27 2 R&D is performed primarily by industry ($366.8 billion), with
other R&D being carried out by academia ($75.2 billion), government
agencies ($62.7 billion), and non-profits ($22.8 billion).2 73
Just as firms have production functions for goods and services, firms
also have production functions for knowledge. 274 The knowledge
production function describes how a firm uses R&D investment and
employment to create intangible assets. The knowledge production
function applies to creation of knowledge by a single firm or by groups
of firms. 275 Firms produce intangible assets including various types of IP:
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. Intangible assets also
268. ORG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION AND DEV. & STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CMTYS., OSLO MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING INNOVATION DATA 1617 (3d ed. 2005) ("The Manual defines four types of innovations that encompass a wide range of
changes in firms' activities: product innovations, process innovations, organisational innovations
and marketing innovations."); see generally Stephen Bryan et al., CEO Stock-Based
Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic
Determinants, 73 J. Bus. 661 (2000) (discussing contracts with executives).
269. ORG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION AND DEV., FRASCATI MANUAL 2015: GUIDELINES FOR
COLLECTING AND REPORTING DATA ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT 45 (2015),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264239012-en.pdf?expires=1541275882&id=id&
accname=guest&checksum=C5F78E17C5D5D32FCCC469D632ACF256
("The term R&D
covers three types of activity: basic research, applied research and experimental development.").
270. Id. at 28 ("For an activity to be an R&D activity, it must satisfy five core criteria. The
activity must be: novel, creative, uncertain, systematic, transferable and/or reproducible.").
271. See 2017 Global R&D Funding Forecast, R&D MAG., Winter 2017, at 7,
https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/3378934/mod-resource/content/l/RD%202016.pdf
("For 2017, total U.S. R&D spending is expected to increase by 2.9% to $527.5 billion or a 1%
increase after accounting for 2017's expected 1.9% inflation rate (EIU/OECD).").
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Zvi Griliches, Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development
to Productivity Growth, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 92, 94-95 (1979).
275. Id.; see also Adam B. Jaffe, Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D:
Evidence from Firms'Patents, Profitsand Market Value, 76 AM. EcON. REV. 984,989 (1986).
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include reports of research results, statistical studies, scientific journal
articles, software, blueprints, and invention prototypes. Firms produce
inventions by employing researchers who have particular skill, judgment,
motivation, creativity, and education. Firms invest in laboratory facilities
and equipment. A firm may also apply a stock of intangible assets and
licensing to produce intangible assets.
Employment contracts protect the interests of managers and
employees who devote effort to R&D. Employment contracts must
provide incentives for researchers to devote efficient effort to R&D, to
make efficient decisions, and to report information accurately. 276 Also,
ICs for invention must address who owns the resulting inventions if R&D
is successful.
Employment contracts also protect the expectation interests of
employers. Firms provide wages and salaries, employee benefits, and
training; invest in intangible assets, capital equipment, facilities, and
complementary resources; and engage in procurement, marketing, sales,
production, and distribution. Employment contracts must provide
incentives for firms to hire specialized personnel and invest in
technological change.
Companies commonly have significant numbers of employment
contracts with research personnel. The Business R&D and Innovation
Survey (BRDIS) estimates that there are about 1.5 million R&D workers
in the U.S.; 27 7 these employees include scientists, engineers, R&D
managers, and support staff.27 8 Brandon Shackelford and Francisco
Moris state:
Scientists and engineers are the researchers responsible
for the design and creation of experiments, theories, and
new products, processes, or methods. Technicians and
other support staff typically work under the supervision of
scientists and engineers and perform tasks such as
computer programming, carrying out experiments,
preparing statistical analysis, and clerical support and
report writing.279

According to Donald Hecker:
High-technology

occupations

are

scientific,

276. See Myerson, supra note 214.
277. Brandon Shackelford and Francisco Moris, NAT'L Sci. FOUND.: NAT'L CTR. FOR SCI.
AND ENG'G STATISTICS, A SNAPSHOT OF BUSINESS R&D EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1

(2016), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsfl7302/nsfl7302.pdf.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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engineering, and technician occupations, the same group
of occupations used to define high-tech industries in this
and earlier studies. They include the following
occupational groups and detailed occupations: computer
and mathematical scientists, Standard Occupational
Classification (soc) 15-0000; engineers, soc 17-2000;
drafters, engineering, and mapping technicians, soc 173000; life scientists, soc 19-1000; physical scientists, soc
19-2000; life, physical, and social science technicians,
soc 19-4000; computer and information systems
managers, soc 11-3020; engineering managers, soc 119040; and natural sciences managers, soc 11-9120.280
The use of ICs for in-house R&D and outsourcing is not a new
phenomenon. David Mowery examines industrial research between 1900
and 1940 and observes the growth of R&D both within manufacturing
companies and in a network of independent research organizations. 2 81
Mowery finds that "[r]ather than functioning as substitutes, the
independent and in-house research laboratories were complements during
this period, exhibiting a division of labor in the performance of research
tasks." 2 82 Division of labor in the performance of research tasks among
firms allows firms to specialize and gain greater expertise in particular
areas of invention and innovation. 283
Innovative firms must hire and motivate highly skilled managers and
employees. 2 84 Companies engaged in technological change offer
specialized employee contracts and human resources management
(HRM) policies.

2 85

ICs for R&D managers and employees are likely to

differ from other types of employment contracts. Pedro Ortin Angel and
Llufs Santamaria Sanchez argue that firms' HIRM practices must adapt to
the particular needs of their R&D departments. 286 They conduct case
studies that examine various HRM practices in R&D, including the
delegation of authority to specialized personnel, the provision of
managerial support, the formation of multidisciplinary teams, internal
280. Daniel E. Hecker, High-Technology Employment: A NAICS-Based Update, MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 57, 58 (2005).
281. David C. Mowery, The Relationship Between Intrafirm and Contractual Forms of
IndustrialResearch in American Manufacturing, 1900-1940, 20 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST.

351 (1983).
282. Id. at 369.
283. See id. at 369-70.
284. Andersson et al., supra note 218, at F326.
285. Pedro Ortin Angel & Lins Santamaria Sdinchez, R&D Managers'AdaptationofFirms'
HRM Practices,39 R&D MGMT. 271, 271 (2009).

286. Id.
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and external networking opportunities, adjustment of recruitment
policies, job rotation, career development, and compensation. 2 87 Kathryn
Martell and Stephen Carroll suggest firms' incentives for R&D personnel
follow "promotion and pay policies that are congruent with employee
expectations and company goals." 288
Firms apply ICs to address the assignment of IP generated through the
employment relationship. This represents a historical shift toward greater
use of contracts. 289 Catherine Fisk notes: "The law of employee
inventions is an unstable mixture of the two bodies of law, the former
honoring the rights of the inventor as employee, the latter being skeptical
of the rights of the employee as inventor." 290 From 1830 to 1930, Fisk
recounts the change in law from an IP regime, in which the employee
owns inventions, to a combination of employment contracts that assign
inventions to the employer and state laws that include "shop rights" for
employers *291
Robert Merges examines the role of IP in employment contracts. 292
Merges observes that "[o]wnership is too blunt an instrument to be an
effective inducement to employee-inventors." 293 Based on economic
analysis, Merges argues that "the law properly allows employers to take
ownership of their employees' inventions." 294 Employment contracts
provide rewards for employees, specify employee duties, and allocate
inventions:
[E]mployers have broad powers-consistently upheld by
the courts-to claim employee inventions by contract. In
addition, these contracts usually impose several related
duties on employees, including (1) a duty to assign patent
applications and patents to the employer, (2) a duty to
assist in the patent prosecution, and (3) a general duty to

287. Id. at 284.
288. Kathryn D. Martell & Stephen J. Carroll Jr., The Role ofHRM in SupportingInnovation
Strategies: Recommendations on How R&D Managers Should Be Treated from an HRM
Perspective, 25 R&D MGMT. 91, 92 (1995).
289. Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the "Fueloflnterest"from the "FireofGenius": Law and
the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1174 (1998).
290. Id. at 1128.
291. Id. at 1130-31 ("[M]ost employees who invent are bound by contracts requiring them

to assign the patents to their employers.").
292. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARv. J.L.
TECH. 1 (1999).
293. Id. at 37.
294. Id. at 3.
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cooperate in the perfection of the employer's rights in the
invention.29 5

Merges also considers three types of default rules under state law. 296
First, when employees engage in "invention for hire," the firm owns the
invention. 2 97 Second, when non-R&D employees engage in firm-related
invention, the employee may own the invention while the firm obtains a
royalty-free license as a "shop right." 298 Third, when employees engage
in independent invention, they generally own the invention. 299 Regarding
employee exit, Merges concludes "both the default rules and the
interpretation of post-employment contracts favor ex-employees." 300
Employment contracts with specialized researchers are subject to
asymmetric information. The firm may not be able to observe fully the
employee's knowledge and skills. Also, it may be difficult for the firm to
observe the experimental design and research activities of specialized
employees. Then, ICs are subject to Principal-Agent problems in contract
design. 30 1 Companies design ICs to provide performance incentives to
specialized managers and employees engaged in invention and
innovation. 3 02

B. Outsourcing Contracts
Companies also use ICs to outsource invention and innovation to
specialized research firms. Shackelford and Moris observe that the
scientific R&D services industry is "dominated by contract research
organizations that assist pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical
device companies with clinical trials management." 303 They find that the
R&D services industry "employs relatively more technicians and support
staff as a share of its domestic R&D employment than do most other
industries." 3 0 4 Firms contract with "star scientists" for access to
knowledge and IP. 305 In-house R&D is complementary to outsourcing

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 26-27.
See Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39.
Shackelford & Moris, supra note 277, at 1.

304. Id.
305. Nicola Lacetera et al., Do Firms Change Capabilitiesby Hiring New People? A Study
of the Adoption of Science-Based Drug Discovery, 21 ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT. 133 (2004);
Lynne G. Zucker et al., Commercializing Knowledge: University Science Knowledge Capture,
and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, 48 MGMT. SCI. 138 (2002).
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R&D because internal knowledge helps the firm absorb external
knowledge.
ICs that outsource R&D to a specialized research firm may face
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 306 The firm may
compensate the specialized research firm based on some measure of
invention or innovation, including revenues or profits.
Many companies outsource various invention and innovation
activities. 307 Paul Trott and Dap Hartmann find that "R&D departments
have long recognised the importance of information and knowledge
beyond their own organizations." 308 Companies rely on many types of
strategic alliances, including "licensing, supplier relations, outsourcing,
joint venture, collaboration (non-joint ventures), R&D consortia, industry
clusters, and innovation networks." 309 Henry Chesbrough and others
describe a trend toward increasing R&D cooperation among firms as
"open innovation."310
It is estimated that companies obtain about half of their innovations
from outside sources. 3 11 Contracting to obtain R&D services from other
firms is complementary to the firm's internal R&D.3 12 For example,
internal R&D increases a firm's absorptive capacity for external
knowledge. 313
306. Poblete & Spulber, supra note 39, at 39 ("Companies and government agencies also
outsource R&D by contracting with research laboratories, specialized firms, universities, and
independent researchers. . . . Corporations and venture capitalists also engage in delegation of
R&D through financing, monitoring, and directing entrepreneurial technology startups,

specialized research firms, and independent researchers.").
307. Reinhilde Veugelers, Internal R&D Expenditures and External Technology Sourcing,
26 REs. POL'Y 303, 308 (1997); Peter Teirlinck et al., Corporate Decision-Making in R&D
Outsourcing and the Impact on InternalR&D Employment Intensity, 19 INDUS. CORP. CHANGE
1741, 1742 (2010).
308. Paul Trott & Dap Hartmann, Why 'Open Innovation' is Old Wine in New Bottles, 13
INT'L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 715, 716 (2009).
309. Id. at 720.
310. Henry W. Chesbrough, The Era of Open Innovation, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring
2003, at 35; Henry W. Chesbrough, Why Companies Should Have Open Business Models, MIT
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 2007, at 22.
311. Ashish Arora et al., The Acquisition and Commercializationof Invention in American
Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact, 45 REs. POL'Y 1113, 1113 (2016) ("Our results indicate
that, between 2007 and 2009, 16% of manufacturing firms had innovated-meaning had
introduced a product that was new to the industry. Of these, 49% report that their most important
new product had originated from an outside source, notably customers, suppliers and technology
specialists (i.e., universities, independent inventors and R&D contractors).").
312. Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella, The Marketfor Technology, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 641, 651 n.8 (Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg eds.,
2010).
313. Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces

of R&D, 99 ECON. J. 569, 589 (1989).
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About four-fifths of world trade moves through a global supply chain
involving networks of suppliers, distributors, and intermediaries. 3 14 The
organization of production through global supply chains often involves
contracts for outsourcing invention and innovation to supply chain
managers and specialized research companies. 3 15 For example,
pharmaceutical companies outsource clinical trials to Contract Research
Organizations (CROs). 316

C. Joint Venture and Consortium Contracts
Firms use contracts to form RJVs and R&D consortia.317 These are
important types of IC. As with any joint venture, the RJV can take the
form of a jointly-owned corporation, partnership, or contract without
equity. 3 18 RJVs and consortia allow companies to cooperate in R&D
while continuing to compete in product markets. 3 19 Joint ventures are an
alternative to expansion of the firm through growth or mergers and
acquisitions (M&A). 320 Klaus Gugler and Ralph Siebert find that in the
semi-conductor industry, RJVs tend to achieve greater efficiency gains
than M&A.3 2 1
Firms form R&D joint ventures and consortia to share the costs and
risks of R&D.3 22 By combining projects, the R&D joint venture can
realize economies of scale in R&D, including specialization of function
and division of labor for researchers. The firms may benefit from
314. See WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2014: TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
RECENT TRENDS AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO 43 (2014).

315. Jeremy Howells et al., The Growth and Management of R&D Outsourcing: Evidence
from UK Pharmaceuticals,38 R&D MGMT. 205, 206 (2008).
316. Pierre Azoulay, CapturingKnowledge Within and Across Firm Boundaries: Evidence
from ClinicalDevelopment, 94 AM. EcON. REV. 1591, 1591 (2004).
317. For a discussion on JVs, see AM. BAR Ass'N, MODEL JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 35972 (2006), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0049/materials/book.pdf.
For a
discussion on R&D consortia, see Suzanne E. Majewski, How Do Consortia Organize
Collaborative R&D? Evidence from the National Cooperative Research Act (Harvard Law Sch.
John M. Olin Ctr. Law, Econ.,
Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 483, 2004),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.615583.
318. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 317.
319. Majewski, supra note 317.
320. DELOITTE, A STUDY OF JOINT VENTURES THE CHALLENGING WORLD OF ALLIANCES 2

(2010), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/fr/Documents/finance/Publications/
EtudeJointVenture-juillet%202010.pdf.
321. Klaus Gugler and Ralph Siebert, Market Power Versus Efficiency Effects of Mergers
and Research Joint Ventures: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry, 89 REV. EcON. STAT.
645, 651 (2007).
322. See James A. Dobkin, Negotiating an InternationalTechnology Joint Venture, 1 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 81, 83 (1985); Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, Equilibrium and Optimal Size of a Research
Joint Venture in an Oligopoly with Spillovers, 43 J. INDUS. EcON. 209, 209 (1995).
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combining complementary skills and knowledge in R&D. Firms also may
cooperate in R&D because it may be difficult to exclude access to each
other's R&D. By combining R&D projects, the firms will appropriate the
benefits of the knowledge created, thus internalizing potential spillovers
that would result from separate projects.3 23 The RJV may also facilitate
various business relationships, including agreements between suppliers
and customers. 324

The partners in an RJV may not be able to observe each other's R&D
efforts or knowledge, which would lead to moral hazard and adverse
selection problems. Addressing these problems requires dividing the
benefits of the partnership based on some measure of performance. It may
not be feasible to design an IC that induces sufficient R&D effort to
maximize the joint benefits of the parties. 325 Licensing arrangements
affect the incentives of partners to share IP with the RJV.32 6
The National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) in 1993
limit antitrust liability for members of R&D consortia. 327 These consortia
report their membership to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
323. According to Yannis Caloghirou et al.:
Company incentives to join an RJV may include one or more of the following:
1. R&D cost sharing;
2. Reduction of R&D duplication;
3. Risk sharing, uncertainty reduction;
4. Spillover internalisation;
5. Continuity of R&D effort, access to finance;
6. Access of complementary resources and skills;
7. Research synergies;
8. Effective deployment of extant resources, further development of resource
base;

9. Strategic flexibility, market access, and the creation of investment 'options';
10. Promotion of technical standards;
11. Market power, co-opting competition;
12. Legal and political advantages.
Yannis Caloghirou et al., Research Joint Ventures, 17 J. EcON. SURV. 541, 556 (2003).
324. Nicholas S. Vonortas, Research Joint Ventures in the U.S., 26 REs. POL'Y 577, 591
(1997).
325. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 325 (1982); Karl
Morasch, Moral Hazardand Optimal ContractFormfor R&D Cooperation,28 J. EcON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 63, 65 (1995).
326. Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., Licensing and the Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint
Ventures, 56 J. ECON. THEORY 43, 44 (1992).
327. National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06
(2018); National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1984) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06 (2018)).
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC).32 8 From 1984 to 2008, 942 joint
ventures registered with the antitrust agencies. 329 The RJV may reduce
competition between the partners but increase competition between the
partners and other firms in the industry. 330
Almost all joint ventures, even if they are not RJVs, involve parent
companies licensing or transferring technology to the venture. 33 1 Kurt
Saunders cautions that negotiation and planning of the RJV should
address the disclosure, ownership, use, and management of IP contributed
to or created by the venture. 332 The RJV agreement should also address
the rights and duties of the partners and the joint venture regarding
protection of IP, as well as infringement and misappropriation. 333 RJVs
can provide contractual protections for intangible assets when there are
. .334 .
.
insufficient patent protections.
D. License Contracts
ICs include IP license contracts. These types of contracts have a
number of common features. 335 The license contract describes the
business relationship between the parties. 336 The license contract
specifies the period of time for the grant of rights to the licensee and lists
the IP that is covered by the agreement. 337 The contract may place various
restrictions on the grant of rights. 33 8 The Code of Federal Regulations
states "the licensing of a patent transfers a bundle of rights which is less
than the entire ownership interest, e.g., rights that may be limited as to
time, geographical area, or field of use." 339 The licensing contract
addresses IP issues that arise when either of the parties makes

328. Yves L. Doz et al., Formation Processes of R&D Consortia: Which Path to Take?
Where Does It Lead?, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 239, 240 (2000).
329. See Majewski, supra note 317.
330. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig, Antitrust for High Technology Industries:
Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers, 28 J. L. ECON. 311, 313-14 (1985).
331. Jordan, supranote 71, at 10.
332. Kurt M. Saunders, The Role of IntellectualPropertyRights in Negotiatingand Planning
a Research Joint Venture, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 75, 97 (2003).
333. Id. at 95.
334. Roberto Hernin et al., An EmpiricalEvaluation of the Determinantsof Research Joint
Venture Formation, 51 J. INDUS. EcON. 75, 87 (2003).
335. See DONALD M. CAMERON & ROWENA BORENSTEIN, KEY ASPECTS OF IP LICENSE

AGREEMENTS 8 (2003), http://wwwjurisdiction.com/1icl01.pdf.
336. Id. at 7.
337. Id. at 32.
338. Id. at 12.
339. USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP)
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s301.html#d0el7687.

§

301 (9th ed. 2015),
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improvements to the technology.3 40 The contract also specifies the IP
holder's compensation, including the way that royalties are calculated.3 4 1
Most IP license contracts are specific to the business relationship
between the licensor and the licensee. 342 This implies that most IP license
contracts require bilateral negotiation that tailors the agreement to the
needs of the relationship. 343 License contracts offered by patent pools are
an exception because they have standardized provisions and royalties. 344
An IP license contract is designed to maximize the joint returns of the
licensor and licensee. 345 The most basic license gives the licensee access
to the licensor's intangible assets. 34 6 These licenses can serve to avoid
litigation or resolve a dispute over JP. 347 More complicated ICs involve
additional business arrangements, including invention, innovation,
investment, marketing, and complementary assets. 34 8
License contracts may provide incentives for inventors to develop and
transfer the invention and for adopters to apply the invention. The
340. CAMERON & BORENSTEIN, supra note 335, at 21 ("There is no widely accepted

definition for 'improvement' in the context of intellectual property licenses, but it is usually used
to mean a development within the field of the licensed technology that enhances the usability,

functionality, efficiency, performance or other characteristic of the original technology.").
341. See generally id. (stating the contract also includes representations and warranties,
disclaimers and limitations of liability, conflict resolution, contract termination and renewal, and
enforceability).
342. Raymond C. Nordhaus, Patent License Agreements, 21 Bus. LAw. 643, 643 (966)

("Because of the infinite variety of rights and obligations that may be established between a patent
licensor and his licensee, there is no 'standard' form of license agreement that may be used in all
situations. Each license agreement must be carefully tailored to the specific circumstances of the
particular case."); Bharat N. Anand and Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, J.

INDUS. ECON. 103, 131 (2000) ("Licensing contracts in the Computer and Electronics industries
are more likely to be signed with firms with whom the licensor has prior relationships, established
either through alliance activity, common board membership, or personnel histories.").
343. See Daniel F. Spulber, Patent Licensing and Bargainingwith Innovative Complements
and Substitutes, 70 REs. EcON. 693, 695 (2016).
344. See id. at 710.

345. Id. at 693.
346. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, How to License Intangible Property, 101

Q. J. EcON.

567, 568 (1986).
347. Sanford E. Warren Jr., Intellectual Property Litigation Rising: How to Protect Your
Company's Financial Health, IRMI (Sept. 2009), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expertcommentary/intellectual-property-litigation-rising-how-to-protect-your-company-s-financialhealth.

348. The demand for licenses is based on "carrots" if the user derives benefits from using
the intangible asset. The demand for licenses is based on "sticks" if the user obtains the license to
avoid litigation over disputed technology. Finally, the demand for licenses is based on "bundles"
if the user obtains the license because it is included in a bundle with complementary goods and
services. See Niklas Ostman, How to Create the 'Pull'for Patent Licensing?, LINKEDIN
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-create-pull-patent-licensing-niklas-%C3%
B6stman?trk=prof-post.
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Principal-Agent problem involving hidden action or hidden information
arises in licensing contracts. 349 Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby study
university licensing agreements and find most include both fixed fees and
royalties; many also include sponsored research clauses and equity. 350
The university licensing agreement with potential licensees involves a
stage in which researchers continue to develop an invention. 351 This is a
moral hazard problem because research efforts are not observable to the
licensee. The licensing contract includes running royalties intended to
induce inventor effort and lump-sum royalties that reflect potential
earnings from commercialization of the invention. 352 Daniel Elfenbein
considers university licensing agreements and observes the incidence of
royalties based on sales, lump-sum license fees, milestones, maintenance
fees and minimums, and equity. 35 3
Inventors often have tacit knowledge that is complementary to their
intangible assets. Inventors incur costs of codifying and communicating
their knowledge to technology adopters. 354 When it is very costly to
transmit the inventor's knowledge, the inventor may have an advantage
in applying that knowledge in comparison to technology adopters.
Technology adopters may have advantages in applying the technology
resulting from their own knowledge and complementary assets. This can
overcome the problem of transmitting the inventor's tacit knowledge,
resulting in technology transfers. 355 Deepak Hegde explores how tacit
knowledge affects the structure of royalties in licensing contracts,
including royalty rates, lump-sum fees, milestones and minimum
payments. 356

349. See In6s Macho-Stadler et al., The Role of Information in Licensing ContractDesign, 25
REs. POL'Y 43, 52 (1996) (discussing the role of information in determining the structure of
royalties in patent licensing contracts); see also Nancy T. Gallini and Brian D. Wright, Technology
Transfer under Asymmetric Information, 21 RAND J. EcON. 147 (1990).
350. Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of
University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001).
351. Id. at 248.
352. See id. at 245.
353. Daniel W. Elfenbein, Contract Structure and Performance of University-Industry
Technology Transfer Agreements (July 30, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452717.
354. Daniel F. Spulber, Tacit Knowledge with Innovative Entrepreneurship, 30 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 641, 641 (2012).

355. Id.
356. Deepak Hegde, Tacit Knowledge and the Structure ofLicense Contracts:Evidencefrom
the Biomedical Industry, 23 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 568, 568 (2014).
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E. Platform Contracts
Firms and cooperative organizations help establish and manage the
market for innovative control.3 57 Firms and cooperative organizations use
platform contracts to reduce transaction costs for both technology
providers and technology adopters. Intermediary firms offer transaction
efficiencies by market making, matching buyers and sellers, and reducing
adverse selection and moral hazard.
Almost all markets are established by profit-maximizing firms acting
as intermediaries. 35 8 Firms provide intermediary services as market
makers by purchasing and reselling goods and services. 359 Such firms
include retailers, wholesalers, and financial brokers. 360 Market makers
clear markets by balancing purchasing and sales and by posting and
adjusting prices. 3 61 Firms also provide intermediary services by acting as
matchmakers, bringing buyers and sellers together. 36 2 Market makers and
matchmakers establish the rules of markets, referred to in finance as
"market microstructure." 363 The Internet has given rise to platforms,
which are digital market places. Intermediary firms that operate digital
markets include Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba.
In the market for innovative control, just as in markets generally, there
are intermediaries that improve the efficiency of transactions. 364 By
handling a high volume of transactions, intermediaries benefit from
economies of scale and scope. 365 These economies are due to benefits
from sharing fixed costs across many units of output or across multiple
products. 36 6 Economies of scale and scope also result from specialization
of function and division of labor among the employees of intermediary
firms. A centralized intermediary can realize economies of scale and
scope in the management of IP, keeping track of patent renewal fees,
monitoring infringement, and defending patents against infringement.
The centralized intermediary can provide convenience by licensing
patent portfolios as bundles.

357. Daniel F. Spulber, Market Microstructure and Intermediation, 10 J. EcON. PERSP. 135,
141 (1996).
358. Id. at 135.

359. Id.
360. Id. at 137-38.
361. Id. at 136.
362. Id. at 145-46.

363. Id. at 135.
364. Id. at 146.
365. Spulber, supranote 77, at 293.

366. Id. at n.168.
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Intermediary firms also improve transaction efficiencies by
centralizing transactions. 3 67 Buyers and sellers derive convenience from
"one-stop-shopping." A buyer can have access to the products of many
sellers and a seller can reach many buyers, but any buyer or seller need
only transact with the intermediary. In markets for innovative control, a
licensee can obtain licenses for the technology of many licensors and a
licensor can provide licenses to many sellers.
There are also transaction efficiencies from platforms that provide
centralized contract negotiation. 368 This is because buyers and sellers
need only negotiate with the intermediary. This dramatically decreases
the number of transaction relationships in comparison to the large number
of bilateral transactions needed with decentralized contracting. With
centralized contracting, agreements and compensation can be
standardized. This allows licensors and licensees to have standardized
contracts with the intermediary. This is particularly important in
industries that have complex innovations requiring a combination of
many different IP licenses.
IP intermediaries use ICs to address non-rivalrous consumption. The
same technology can be used simultaneously by many firms to produce
new inventions and to develop innovative products, production
processes, and transaction methods. IP intermediaries provide central
hubs to realize the returns from contracts with many adopters.
IP intermediaries address transaction costs in patent transfers and
patent licensing. 36 9 According to an FTC study of "Patent Assertion
Entities," about half of the companies in the study used patent acquisition
contracts that shared licensing revenue with the inventor or employer of
the inventor. 370 The companies in the study acted as intermediaries
between patent holders and licensees. 37 1
Some companies acquire patents and provide a "one-stop-shopping"
platform for licensees. Consider for example, the patent intermediary
Avanci:
367. Spulber, supranote 357, at 145.
368. Daniel F. Spulber, The Economics of Markets and Platforms, 28 J. EcON. MGMT.
STRATEGY 159, 169-70 (2019).
369. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. Marketfor
Technology, 1870-1920 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9017, 2002),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w9017.pdf; James F. McDonough III, The Myth ofthe Patent Troll:
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189,
207 (2007).
370. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY (2016),

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/
pl3l203_patent assertionentity-activity-anftc-study_0.pdf.
371. Id. at 100; see also John E. Dubiansky, The Licensing Function of Patent
Intermediaries, 15 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 269, 273 (2017).
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Avanci has created the first platform for loT
manufacturers to license crucial, standard-essential
wireless technologies with an emphasis on fair,
transparent pricing. Avanci's pricing model offers flat rate
royalty calculations that streamline licensing and enable
predictable costs to help loT developers capitalize on a
dynamic market opportunity. 372
Avanci emphasizes the benefits of "one-stop-shopping" and the
implications of connectivity:
Products with wireless connectivity require access to
thousands of patented inventions, created by many
inventors. Avanci is bringing together standard-essential
wireless patents that represent the most advanced wireless
technology in the world, in an efficient, one-stop
marketplace. So, instead of going to each technology
owner to request, negotiate and pay for a license, makers
of products for the Internet of Things can get the
technology they need in one place. 373
Avanci points out that transaction efficiencies increase incentives for
innovation:
By providing licenses to essential wireless technology
at fair rates, Avanci is helping ensure companies who need
connectivity for their products can access it easily, and
those creating wireless technology can share it as widely
as possible. And both are incentivized to never stop
innovating.

374

IC intermediaries also include cooperative non-profit institutions such
as patent pools and other Collective Rights Organizations (CROs).3 75 By
offering transaction efficiencies, such private contracting institutions
help to avoid antitrust scrutiny and government-mandated licensing. 376
372. AVANCI, AVANCI: ACCELERATING

IoT CONNECTIVITY

2 (2016), http://avanci.com/wp-

content/uploads/2017/01/2016-Avanci-WP-Final-_-Jan-24.pdf.
373. Technology, AVANCI, http://avanci.com/technology/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
374. Id.
375. Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent

Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 285 (2017) ("The benefit for licensees is easy to appreciate: 'one stop
shopping' for many patents at once. This conserves on the cost of licensing numerous patents
from dispersed patent holders by, in a sense, compressing that process into a single event.").
376. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996) ("Collective Rights
Organizations (CROs) will often emerge to break the transactional bottleneck. From patent pools
to collective copyright licensing organizations such as ASCAP and BMI, IPR owners in various
industries have demonstrated the workability of these private transactional mechanisms. Indeed,
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Robert Merges argues that "[t]he high costs of contracting-both among
members, and between members and users-drive the right holders to
pool their property rights in a collective organization." 377
Patent pools act as intermediaries and provide transaction platforms
for patent holders and licensees. 378 Patent pools reduce the transaction
costs of combining licenses for complementary inventions. 379 For
example, MPEG LA, LLC provided a "one-stop-shopping" platform for
licensing patents covering the international digital video compression
standard MPEG-2.38 0 MPEG LA operated licensing programs covering
"thousands of patents owned by hundreds of patent holders in nearly 100
countries with over 6,000 licensees." 3 81
CONCLUSION

It has long been observed that "possession is nine-tenths of the law,"
although there is much more to law than property. Similarly, discussions
of knowledge and technological change tend to focus on IP. Yet, there is
much more to Intellectual Law than IP.
The Intellectual Law framework introduced in this Article provides a
comprehensive framework for dynamic efficiencies in technological
change. The present discussion emphasizes that IC rules play an
important role in Intellectual Law. ICs protect the expectation interests of
those who invest in technological change. ICs allow variation in
investment over time as parties make discoveries. IC law provides the
basis for creating, developing, sharing, and applying intangible assets
needed for technological change. IC rules enhance the economic
contributions of both IP and IT rules.
IP provides the foundation of the market for innovative control, but IP
is not sufficient for technological change. IP is incomplete and provides
limited exclusivity. IP can be subject to public policy shocks that tend to
weaken protections for inventors, innovators, and adopters. Also, the IT
protections for inventors shift consent from IP owners to infringers. This
suggests the need to reconsider the IP versus IT controversy in the context
of contributions made by IC.
Technological change requires agreements that induce future
performance. Cooperative investment generates invention, innovation,
and technology adoption. Firms make these investments based on
these case studies uncover two distinct advantages of CROs: expert tailoring and reduced political
economy problems.").
377. Id. at 1302.
378. Id. at 1340-42.
379. Id. at 1340.
380. Lacy Horn, Alternative Approaches to IP Management: One-stop Technology Platform
Licensing, 9 J. Com. BIOTECHNOLOGY 119, 120 (2003).

381. MPEGLA, https://www.mpegla.com. (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
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agreements with employees, suppliers, partners, investors, and
customers. Technological change based on IC rules promotes economic
development and drives economic growth.
ICs differ from standard contracts in various ways. ICs realize the
benefits from non-rivalrous usage of technology through such
mechanisms as licensing, cross-licensing, RJVs, R&D consortia, and
one- stop- shopping platforms. ICs provide incentives for exploratory
performance. ICs induce effort and revelation of information by
rewarding performance using measures related to technological change.
In contrast to contracts for the routine production of goods and services,
ICs consider fundamental uncertainty. ICs must handle problems arising
when contracting parties' efforts and information are unobservable and
unverifiable. Such contracting difficulties are more likely to occur with
invention and innovation than with more routine activities. ICs provide
incentives for invention, innovation, and adoption. ICs achieve gains
from trade in technology, thus increasing the rewards of IP holders
beyond what they could achieve through IP alone.
The rate and direction of technological change have increased the shift
toward IC. Greater connectivity and exchange of data among firms
requires agreements for discovery and sharing knowledge. Increased
emphasis of software over hardware means that inventions and
innovations are virtual, further increasing the importance of intangible
assets. The development of Al requires agreements between firms and
employees and among firms to address new forms of knowledge creation.
The technological development of the economy is transforming contracts
and generating the need for a framework of "Intellectual Law."

